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The Afghan government is preparing to deal with the world’s largest youth bulge, 
a demographic event that threatens to destabilize the country if the Afghan 
government and U.S. aid agencies do not disarm the grievances of Afghan 
youth, especially at the university level. This thesis examines higher education in 
Afghanistan from the 1930s onward and describes how various regimes affected 
educational policy while in power. Also examined is how Afghan youth have 
historically been a source of instability if their grievances are not addressed. 
Despite tremendous efforts by the Afghan government and U.S. aid 
organizations to improve higher education after the Taliban era, implementing 
effective policies continues to problematic. This thesis answers the questions of 
why the Afghan government and U.S. aid agencies have had such a difficult time 
in implementing effective policies to address the youth bulge and challenges to 
higher education in the country. Evidence is provided to show that poor 
infrastructure, outdated curricula, unqualified instructors, corruption, religious 
activism, insecurity, high levels of unemployment, and underemployment are 
detrimental to national stability, as Afghan youth flock abroad in pursuit of better 
opportunities or join the insurgency out of desperation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Education is the backbone of Afghanistan—it is the foundation for 
rebuilding the society.”  
—12th-grade boy in Herat1 
 
While the United States gears for the graying of its population like most of 
the industrialized world, Afghanistan prepares to deal with the world’s largest 
youth bulge: 65 percent of the population and growing at an annual rate of  
2.8 percent.2 The youth bulge refers to the disproportionate (more than  
65 percent) representation of young people, aged 15 to 24, in the population.3 A 
large youth population can be a boon to Afghan society, because its vigor and 
productive potential may spell economic gains and democratic action. On the 
other hand, terrible simplifiers, such as the Taliban’s promise of financial 
incentives and social advancement for insurgents, could potentially sway the 
young people of Afghanistan if they have no other, better prospects.4 Indeed, 
research conducted in 2010 postulates that a correlation exists between 
countries that have large youth populations and the likelihood of civil war or 
instability.5  
Afghanistan is a war-ravaged country with high rates of unemployment, 
hovering at around 40 percent. While Afghanistan’s most recent National Risk 
and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/2008 shows youth unemployment rates at  
                                            
1 Fred M. Hayward, “Strategic Planning for Higher Education in Developing Countries: 
Challenges and Lessons,” Society for College and University Planning 36, no. 5 (June, 2008): 6–
7. 
2 Linda Lavender, “The Youth Bulge in Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities,” Civil 
Military Fusion Center, October 2011, 1, 
https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Social%20Well-
being%20Archive/CFC_Afg_Youth_Bulge_Oct03.pdf. 
3 Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, April 27, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts/p13093.  
4 Norine MacDonald et al., “Afghanistan The Relationship Gap,” International Council on 
Security and Development, July 2010, 46, 
http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/afghanistan_relationship_gap.pdf.  
5 Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge.’” 
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10 percent, that relatively moderate figure conceals high levels of 
underemployment.6 More than 90 percent of jobs are deemed “vulnerable 
employment.”7  
The 2014 withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan portends a 
changed security and political scene for Afghanistan, with prominent voices from 
many quarters predicting at least some turmoil before the post-Taliban state and 
society gain the kind of traction that brings stability and prosperity to wide swaths 
of the population. Thus, Afghanistan might be the next victim of the youth-bulge 
theory, which asserts that a country’s susceptibility to internal armed conflict, 
unrest, or political violence is related to the percentage of 15- to 24-year-olds in 
its population who have limited socioeconomic and political opportunities.8  
Without a concerted intervention through policy and on-the-ground 
programs, particularly at the university level, the youth bulge threatens to unravel 
the progress made since the Taliban was ousted by allied forces in 2001. To 
remove a problematic regime is one thing, but to rebuild stabilizing institutions is 
another undertaking entirely. A failure to provide the young with options would 
have ramifications well beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Its South Asian neighbors, 
particularly Pakistan, would face increased pressures from Afghan refugees 
displaced by rising violence and instability, as well as an increase in cross-border 
terrorism and the spread of extremism. In other words, without guidance or 
options, Afghanistan’s youth could become a marginalized generation 
susceptible to insurgent recruitment. 
                                            
6 ICON Institute, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/2008: A profile of 




7 Ibid., 26–28. 
8 Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge.’”  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research examines what the trajectory of the higher-education 
system in Afghanistan has been since 2001 and what challenges and problems 
have this created for Afghanistan. Why is the youth bulge considered a threat to 
stability in the country? Despite the tremendous effort of the Afghan government 
and U.S. aid organizations to improve the higher education system after the 
Taliban era, why has implementing effective policies been so problematic?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Empirical analysis reveals that a large male youth population (aged 15–
29) increases the likelihood of civil conflict, particularly when this group does not 
have access to higher education and has limited employment opportunities.9 The 
correlation between youth exclusion and political violence becomes especially 
profound when the youth demographic reaches 35 to 40 percent.10 Today, some 
two-thirds of Afghanistan’s population is below the age of 25.11 
The United States has spent more than $600 billion in humanitarian and 
military assistance for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, but the results have 
been uneven, at best.12 To be sure, rampant corruption, the booming opium 
trade, and meddling neighbor states (Pakistan and Iran) are other important 
factors that must be resolved, but the plight of Afghanistan’s youth—young men 
as well as young women—must also be a top priority if Afghanistan is to achieve 
enduring peace.  
                                            
9 Matthew Connelly, “Young and Restless Can Be a Volatile Mix,” Science, July 29, 2011, 
552–554, http://geography.sdsu.edu/News/images/2011/Science-2011-Hvistendahl-youth-
bulge.pdf.  
10 Ibid., 552. 
11 Srinjoy Bosen, “Afghan Youth: Separating Fact from Fiction,” The Diplomat, November 13, 
2013, http://thediplomat.com/the-pulse/2013/11/13/afghan-youth-separating-fact-from-fiction/.  
12 Joel Brinkley, “Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of U.S. aid to Afghanistan,” World Affairs 
Journal, January/February 2013, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/money-pit-monstrous-
failure-us-aid-afghanistan; Anthony H. Cordesman, “The U.S. Cost of the Afghan War: FY 2002–
2013,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,” May 15, 2012, 
http://csis.org/publication/us-cost-afghan-war-fy2002-fy2013.  
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So far, the Afghan government and U.S. aid agencies have achieved 
negligible results in addressing the grievances of Afghan youth and providing 
opportunities for them to improve their socioeconomic conditions, as represented 
by poor access to quality higher education and high levels of unemployment and 
underemployment. Disillusionment and lack of financial and educational 
prospects make Afghan youth susceptible to permanently exiting the country or 
joining the insurgency, since the Taliban can offer hefty financial incentives and 
other social benefits.13 Additionally, the failure to integrate the youth into nation-
building efforts exacerbates anti-American sentiment and generates insecurity in 
the region. According to Jorritt Kaminga, the security transition of 2014 can 
potentially serve as the perfect “window of opportunity” for a renewed focus on 
youth engagement at the university level, which “could easily prove to be one of 
the most cost-effective and beneficial actions for future stability.”14  
A focus on university students by policy makers will be of utmost 
importance because they are the future leaders of Afghanistan and have the 
potential to promote peace in the region and development in the country. At the 
same time, history illustrates they can also disrupt a system if dissatisfied. In the 
1970s, when the Afghan government could not create enough job opportunities 
for the rapidly increasing number of university graduates, Afghan youth held 
mass protests throughout the country. Discontent over grim employment 
prospects among the youth was a leading cause for the downfall of the monarchy 
in 1973, by a coup d’état led by Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan.15 While 
education is crucial to creating social change, the type of education delivered to 
beneficiaries must be suited to the country and its context.  
                                            
13 Spencer Ackerman, “The Taliban Pays Its Troops Better than Karzai Pays His,” Wired, 
July 26, 2010, http://www.wired.com/2010/07/taliban-pays-its-troops-better-than-karzai-pays-his/. 
14 Jorritt Kaminga, “From security transition to civilian power: Supporting Afghan youth after 
2014,” Clingendael Policy Brief, no. 8 (June, 2012): 1, 
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20120600_clingendael_policy_8.pdf.  
15 Yukitoshi Matsumoto, “Education for Demilitarizing Youth in Post-Conflict Afghanistan,” 
Research in Comparative and International Education 3, no. 1 (January, 2008): 67.  
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There is considerable hope that Afghanistan’s youth will be part of the 
stabilizing force and an important resource for national prosperity if the proper 
mechanisms are set in place at both the central and regional level. At this 
juncture, several issues face Afghan youth that both the Afghan government and 
U.S. aid agencies must address. First, many universities cannot absorb the 
staggering number of high-school graduates. According to the ministry of higher 
education, in 2013 there were only 12,000 slots available for admission to 
universities, but more than 60,000 Afghan high-school students who applied.16 
Although private universities have been propped up throughout the country to 
absorb student demand, “inadequate capacity and lack of proper infrastructure” 
limit their ability to admit applicants.17 Moreover, unlike public universities, private 
institutions charge high tuition rates that many Afghan students cannot afford.18  
The second major issue is that those university students fortunate enough 
to gain entrance encounter significant challenges after enrollment. Mass protests 
throughout college campuses, including Faryab, Bamiyan, and Kabul 
universities, demonstrate youth frustration over severely outdated curricula, 
deteriorating facilities, and unqualified instructors.19 Another major challenge is 
corruption in the education system. ‘Ghost teachers’ and bribery are significant 
issues that have hindered prospects of quality education.  
                                            
16 “Afghan youth are being neglected,” Watan, accessed May 11, 2014, http://www.watan-
afg.com/new_page_7.htm. 
17 Rahima Baharustani, “Comprehensive Study of Higher Education in Afghanistan,” 
Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, December 2012, 7, 
http://www.aisa.org.af/study/Comprehensive%20study%20of%20Higher%20Education%20in%20
Afghanistan_2.pdf.  
18 Ibid., 7–10. 
19 “Afghan youth are being neglected.” 
 6
Religious activism in Afghan universities is another concern, because of 
its potential negative implications.20 Religious activism becomes a problem when 
extremist elements drown out the voices of moderates at the universities. Should 
extreme religiosity increase among the college-age demographic, it could 
translate into more rigid Islamist policies in the future, which in turn could hinder 
prospects for democratization and development in the country, particularly for 
women.  
At this juncture, religiosity within various Afghan universities, particularly in 
Pashtun-dominated regions, is relatively strong, given the ethnic affinity with the 
Taliban and culturally conservative views. In Jalalabad University, Islamist 
groups have increased in popularity as a response to the “aggressively secular 
behavior of the chancellor of the university.”21 Many religious students have 
accused the chancellor of propagating anti-Islamic messages by insisting that 
classes be gender-integrated in the Sharia faculty. The chancellor has also been 
accused of appointing members only from the secular-based political group 
Afghan Millat to the university.22 In this particular instance, religiosity is a 
consequence of the chancellor’s push for secularization upon a traditionally 
conservative student body. Nevertheless, in general, the prevalence of extremist 
religious activism and methods of circumventing it in Afghan universities must be 
addressed.  
Afghan youth who feel protests have been futile and are either unwilling or 
unable to migrate the country often resort to joining the insurgency as a means of 
                                            
20 Ibid., “Poverty and Unemployment Forcing People to Join Terror Outfits: Swedish 
Diplomat,” Tolo News, October 8, 2013, http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/11381-poverty-
and-unemployment-forcing-people-to-join-terror-outfits-swedish-
diplomat?lang=fa&device=desktop; Given that Afghanistan is a predominantly Muslim country (98 
percent), the majority of Afghan university students identify as Muslim as well. 
21 Anotionio Giustozzi, “Between Patronage and Rebellion: Student Politics in Afghanistan,” 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, March 26, 2010, 12, 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/27967. 
22 Ibid., 13. 
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sustenance for themselves and their families.23 Afghan experts, including the 
Swedish diplomat to Afghanistan, Henrik Linder Halm, and Guy Wilobe, the head 
of the Hello Trust Foundation, have repeatedly expressed concern that the lack 
of access to educational opportunities and staggering youth unemployment rates 
are the leading reasons for many Afghan youth to join the insurgency.24 Afghan 
youth in Khost and Faryab province, as well as ex-Taliban fighters, have stated 
that limited socioeconomic opportunities led them to engage in robberies and join 
criminal groups or the Taliban.25  
Afghan youth are also faced by the challenges of poor quality of 
instruction in universities, which results in the inability to find employment. These 
students are desperate to make headway and eager to rebuild their country, but 
see little potential for social mobility, despite the billions in aid money provided by 
the United States. Students feeling disillusioned about their future in Afghanistan 
have fled by the thousands to neighboring countries, including Iran, Pakistan, 
and India, for better economic opportunities.26 Thousands of other desperate 
young Afghans have tried to illegally smuggle themselves by sea to European 
countries.27 Currently, Italy reports more than 4,000 illegal Afghans between 19 
and 24 years of age.28 Hundreds of others have lost their lives during the journey 
or been deported.  
                                            
23 “Students protest at Bamiyan University,” Watan-e-Afghanistan, April 14, 2005, 
http://farsi.alarabiya.net/fa/afghanistan/2013/10/23/سيئر-کي-هسسوم-نيام-یکاپ-رد-دروم-طوقس-تموکح-
ناتسناغفا-رادشھ-داد.html.  
 24 “Poverty and Unemployment Forcing People to Join Terror Outfits.” 
25 Sadaf Shinwari, “Unemployment boost insurgency and crime,” Khama Press, May 27, 
2013, http://www.khaama.com/unemployment-boost-insurgency-and-crime-9000900.  
 26 “As 2014 NATO pullout approaches, more Afghans flee their homeland,” Washington 
Post, January 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/liveblog/wp/2013/01/30/as-2014-
nato-pullout-approaches-more-afghans-flee-their-homeland/.  
27Ibid., “Afghans illegally leaving the country,” Youtube Video, posted by Ahmad Fawad 
Ahmady, July 4, 2009,  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DL7qi_Dw_oI, http://www.watan-
afg.com/new_page_7.htm. 
28 “Afghans illegally leaving the country.” Abid Amiri, “Why Are Afghans Leaving 




Essentially, access to quality higher education is crucial for Afghan youth 
because it provides avenues for social mobility, an important stabilizer. While 
other institutions also need to cooperate to foster an economy that will provide 
jobs, education is the first step to stabilizing the country for youth.29 According to 
a 2013 World Bank Report, higher education establishes and sustains a 
democratic society by offering intellectual leadership and the ability to examine 
what form of political democracy best suits a particular society.30 Higher 
education can also play a pivotal role in transforming a country’s deeply cultural 
and religious traditions into more progressive ideals. Higher education can 
potentially “cultivate democratic values in students by modeling a culture of 
tolerance and rejection of discrimination based on ethnicity, gender or religious 
belief.”31 The existing structural methods in universities have had some positive 
results; however, the Afghan government and U.S. aid agencies can do much 
more to improve instructional quality without seriously undermining other 
priorities or concerns. Lack of access to quality higher education, the potential for 
extremist religious activism within universities, unemployment, and insecurity 
continue to threaten the country. 
The most challenging aspect of this research is to identify new paradigms 
and opportunities that will improve the quality of higher education in public 
institutions, address extremist religious activism in universities, and create 
specific guidelines or suggestions for increasing employment opportunities for 
university graduates. Moreover, it is difficult to assess how U.S. aid agencies can 
assist the Afghan government to help overcome impediments to higher 
education.  
                                            
29 Harsha Aturupane, Higher Education in Afghanistan: An Emerging Mountainscape 
(Washington: World Bank, August 2013), 3–5, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/09/05/000333037_20130
905112816/Rendered/PDF/809150WP0Afgha0Box0379822B00PUBLIC0.pdf.  
30 Ibid., 3–5.  
 31 Ibid.,6–9. 
 9
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The proposed analysis will be an exploratory case study that will look at 
the history of higher education in Afghanistan. Scholarly writings and news briefs 
by local Afghans on current challenges in achieving quality higher education and 
youth employment are analyzed. The author’s fluency in the Dari and Urdu 
languages allows access to blogs, posts, journal entries, and Afghan news media 
to gauge the sentiments of Afghan youth. A variety of official statistical analyses 
and reports produced by the World Bank, UNESCO, Amnesty International, 
USAID, and the Afghan ministries of higher education and labor are also 
reviewed and put in political and social context. Also analyzed is what U.S.-led 
allies have achieved so far and whether their objectives have met the needs of 
Afghan youth.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides the history of higher education in Afghanistan, the 
background of Afghanistan’s political system, and how the various government 
regimes affected educational policy while in power. Sections will examine the 
eras of Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933–1973), President Daoud Khan (1973–
1979), Soviet rule (1979–1989), Mujahadeen rule (1992–1996), Taliban rule 
(1996–2001), and GIROA (2001–present). This chapter demonstrates how these 
political groups focused on higher education as a means of promulgating their 
ideology (whether communism, Islamism, or democracy) and shows the impact 
students have historically made in ousting regimes because their grievances 
were not met.  
Chapter III examines U.S.-led efforts after 2001 to advance higher 
education in Afghanistan and the results thus far. Subsections note the 
accomplishments of U.S. agencies and show problems that remain or have 
emerged from current developments. Chapter IV looks at the challenges the 
Afghan government and U.S. organizations are facing with regard to higher 
education in Afghanistan. Evidence is provided to show that poor infrastructure, 
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outdated curricula, unqualified instructors, corruption, religious activism, 
insecurity, high levels of unemployment, and underemployment have adversely 
affected the country, as Afghan youth flock abroad in pursuit of better educational 
and economic opportunities or join the insurgency out of desperation.32 This 
section also looks at security challenges, the extent of extremist religious 
activism in Afghan universities, and whether extremism is hindering 
democratization in the country. Chapter V concludes with a summary of results, 
recommendations, and concluding points. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW: HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE YOUTH 
BULGE 
The following literature review examines various theories concerning the 
role of education in modernizing a developing country. While a young population 
is a boon to society, it can also be highly problematical if the needs of the young 
are not met and no proper mechanisms are in place to provide educational 
opportunities, particularly at the university level. Impediments to higher education 
in developing countries and possible solutions are discussed. The literature not 
only highlights the significance of higher education, but also the importance of 
contextualizing types of education that cater to the country. Essentially, there is 
no universal blueprint to outline what higher education should look like. Instead, a 
plan depends on a given country’s conditions and capabilities.  
1. Modernization Theory and Higher Education  
Modernization theory asserts that developing countries can attain 
economic and social growth by emulating the processes followed by developed 
countries.33 One way of looking at modernization theory is as a linear path. 
                                            
32 Bijoyeta Das, “Afghan Students Travel to India in Search of Higher Education,” 
Thinkbrigade, July 30, 2012, http://thinkbrigade.org/development/story-for-review-afghan-
students/index.html.  
33 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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communication process designed to bring about learning.” M.J. Kelly, The Origins and 
Development of Education in Zambia: Pre Colonial Times to 1996 (Lusaka: Image Publishers, 
1999). 
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Walter Rostow, a leading exponent of the idea that modernization has a 
sequential path, postulates a five-stage model for development: first, starting 
from a traditional society, conditions for “takeoff” in the second stage must be 
present. The third stage is takeoff, followed by a drive to maturity in stage four 
and ending with high mass consumption in stage five. According to Rostow, a 
traditional society is one characterized by subsistence agriculture with limited 
economic mobility. The conditions for takeoff are an increased spread distribution 
of technology, investment in production expansion, and relative improvement in 
individual social mobility. Afghanistan would currently fall under the second stage 
in Rostow’s model. Although education plays a paramount and direct role in all of 
Rostow’s stages of development, it figures most prominently in the second stage, 
which Afghanistan might have just barely reached.  
According to Rostow, as individuals in a traditional society develop 
innovative irrigation and farming techniques, they gain more free time because of 
improved living standards. They can think beyond mere sustenance and become 
more cognizant of their role in society and of other ways of investing, such as 
manufacturing. This newfound knowledge enables individuals to think in broader 
terms and perhaps be willing to consider getting involved in the market as 
investors. Education plays a critical role throughout the development phase, 
because it allows individuals to recognize their rights and privileges in society, 
which can potentially induce democratization.  
From Rostow’s perspective, Afghanistan is at a pivotal juncture because in 
the past decade, there has been increased investment in agricultural production, 
technology, and education. At noted, Afghanistan has likely arrived at Rostow’s 
second stage of development. If the Afghan government can provide greater 
access to quality education, especially at the university level, Afghan youth can 
advance the country to the third stage: the takeoff stage. 
 In takeoff, Afghan youth could be expected to contribute to increased 
urbanization, industrialization, technological breakthroughs, and capital 
accumulation. After Afghanistan achieved a long period of self-sustaining growth, 
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the country could reach a drive to maturity. Rostow would define this stage “as 
the period when a country has effectively applied the range of modern 
technology to the bulk of its resources.”34 At this point, the Afghan economy 
might find its place in the international economy, poverty rates might decline, and 
the standard of living might increase. Afghanistan could then reach the final 
stage, high mass consumption, which means that Afghan consumers would 
focus on durable goods. In addition, the country would have options as to 
whether it wanted to focus on military and security problems or welfare and 
equality. All the aforementioned scenarios are merely hypothetical, but if 
Rostow’s theory is true, developing countries such as Afghanistan must traverse 
each of these stages to reach modernity. Embracing Rostow’s theory means 
acknowledging a linear path to modernization for developing countries.  
Theorists including Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel challenge this 
linear approach.35 They argue that development is non-deterministic, since a 
“given country’s leaders and nation specific events also matter.”36 More 
importantly, Inglehart and Welzel posit that modernization is not permanent, 
since it can be reversed by economic collapse. They dismiss the notion that 
economic development per se will inevitably change worldviews. They 
emphasize that religious and historical heritages leave “a lasting imprint” and cite 
the difficulty of breaking them down. Both authors state that economic 
development causes enduring social change, which increases individual self-
expression. As individuals become more aware of their rights, social phenomena 
such as civil society, gender equality, and democratization begin to emerge. 
Ingelhart and Welzel do not discuss the importance of education in the 
modernization process, but self-expression implicitly occurs once individuals 
become educated and aware of the world around them. Therefore, education is 
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an important aspect in stabilization and development, whether one offers a 
modernization perspective or a critical one.  
While modernization theory has positive aspects, it assumes that all 
societies should follow the “successful” path established by Western societies. 
Dean C. Tipps points to this assumption in arguing that modernization theory 
“evaluates the progress of nations compared to that proximity of Western 
institutions and values.”37 Although education and industrialization are important 
for developing countries, Tipps posits that advancing the cause of modernization 
often enables Western countries to engage in “cultural imperialism,” because 
they see their version of development as the correct method for modernization, 
which should be applied to all societies.38 Tipps uses the example of European 
colonialism to demonstrate how the British justified their imperial ambitions under 
the guise of “modernizing” traditional, and what of they believed to be “primitive,” 
societies.39 Another example is the U.S. during the Cold War, in which the U.S. 
sought to avert Communist expansion and establish cultural hegemony by 
exporting Western values throughout the third world. While Western patterns of 
modernization may cause the entry of external players, most scholars agree that 
some elements of it are necessary. It is the implementation that needs to be 
customized to protect local communities, as the case in Afghanistan will illustrate. 
We see in Afghanistan the importance of being culturally sensitive to the society 
while trying to pursue to modernization.  
Occupational specialization, urbanization, and most importantly, rising 
educational levels bring about modernization, and increase the likelihood of 
democratization. The type of democracy embraced, however, may not be the 
Western form. Although Afghans have embraced democratic elections, as 
evidenced by the mass turnout (60 percent) in the 2014 presidential elections, 
                                            
37 Dean C. Tipps, “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical 
Perspective,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 15, no. 2 (March, 1973): 203–204, 206.  
38 Ibid., 210. 
39 Ibid., 210–211. 
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they generally have negative associations with “democracy.”40 Hundreds of 
interviews conducted by the Afghan Research Evaluation Unit (AREU) “indicate 
that the idea of democracy [for Afghans] extends far beyond elections and 
parliamentary politics to encompass an entire package of Western liberal values, 
where freedom is equated with an absence of rules, immorality, and 
secularism.”41 Though Afghans may accept certain aspects of the democratic 
process if they are seen to be compatible with local customs and traditions, they 
will not embrace the liberalized form of democracy practiced in the West if it runs 
counter to Afghan religious and cultural values.42 Thus, modernization critics 
argue that even if the end goal for modernization theorists is democratization, it 
might not resemble the type of democracy they envisioned. Therefore, 
development has to be customized to the concept. 
Tipps also adds that modernization theory has made “tradition” the 
antithesis of modernity. He argues that these two concepts do not have to be 
mutually exclusive, because “traditional values and systems facilitate rather than 
impede social changes associated with modernization.”43 He therefore calls “for 
approaches to modernization that avoid dubious assumptions concerning the 
nature of traditional institutions and their contribution to the modernization 
process.”44 This is a significant point, because while modernization can be 
perceived as transitional, abandoning all existing traditions for the sake of 
achieving modernity may not be necessary. For example, in a more tailored form 
of democracy, Afghanistan’s traditional jirgas (assemblies) could continue. The 
jirga tradition dates back at least three centuries and brings together elders and 
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community leaders to discuss matters of importance to the village, such as tribal 
disputes and domestic concerns.  
While the Loya Jirga focuses on national matters, the council of elders in 
the local jirgas has the authority to implement decisions at the local level.45 Local 
jirgas can play a significant role in influencing traditionally conservative Afghan 
parents in rural parts of the country to allow their children, especially girls, to 
attend school. More often than not, Afghan villagers adhere to the dicta of their 
local leaders more than those of the central government.46 This acceptance of 
traditional organization may allow many Afghan youth to attend school with their 
parents’ and community leaders’ blessing. If parents throughout Afghanistan 
commonly refuse to allow their children to enroll in school, this will have negative 
implications for the youth bulge—a large youth population will fail to acquire an 
education and will likely become embittered by limited prospects. While the 
United States has turned to jirgas for advice, the Afghan government has not 
capitalized on the significance that it can have in insurgent prone or conservative 
areas throughout the country.  
2. Youth Bulge 
Youth can play a pivotal role in modernization. According to the World 
Bank, more than of half the world’s population is now below the age of 25, of 
which 1.5 billion are classified as youth, and 86 percent live in the developing 
world.47 Most of the literature on countries experiencing the youth bulge 
postulate several alternative scenarios: civil unrest, radicalization, or human and 
economic development. The chances of violence and radicalization among youth 
are dramatically increased if the state, private sector, and international-aid 
                                            
45 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Consultative Loya Jirga, accessed 
May 21, 2014, http://jirga.gov.af/en. 
46 Ali Wardak, Jirga: A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan (UK: 
University of Glamorgan, 2003).  
47 World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (Washington, 




agencies fail to address incipient challenges. The existing literature therefore 
emphasizes the importance of universal access to quality education and 
employment opportunities as a means of averting conflict and militancy.48  
As expressed in the UNDP Arab Human Development Report, the youth-
bulge phenomenon is a double-edged sword, in that it “presents both challenges 
and opportunities.”49 Furthermore, it is contingent on “whether countries can use 
the human potential represented by their populations well enough to satisfy 
people’s aspirations for a fulfilling life.”50 Failure to invest in the young not only 
can be not only “a force for immiseration,” but also a source for potentially 
dangerous consequences, namely, rebellion or insurgencies.51 According to 
Population Action International (PAI), a Washington-based advocacy group, 
between “1970 and 1999, 80 percent of civil conflicts occurred in countries 
[Angola, Tanzania, Yemen, Syria, Chad, Congo] where 60 percent of the 
population or more were under the age of thirty.”52 This data demonstrates the 
significant negative impact the youth bulge can have in a society. 
3. Higher Education 
Educational scholars, including Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, posit that 
in countries experiencing a youth bulge, expanding public access to education 
makes rebel recruitment more costly and rebellion less likely.53 Essentially, they 
argue that if youth are fully invested and relatively content with their lives, they 
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are less likely to join an insurgency.54 Collier emphasizes the overall importance 
of education. Fuller agrees with Collier and adds that higher education may not 
induce stability right away, but it contributes to the long-term development of a 
country.55 According to a report conducted by the Afghanistan Investment 
Support Agency (AISA), higher education adds skills to the labor force that 
enhance productivity. The report adds that higher education improves workers’ 
employment stability because it allows them to maintain their jobs or find new 
jobs “in the face of changing economic conditions.”56 Higher education also 
increases the standard of living and makes individuals resistant to political 
manipulation.57  
In Afghanistan, youth and their families realize the importance of receiving 
an education, as seen in the staggering re-enrollment of students after the fall of 
the Taliban.58 The difficulty is not trying to convince the young to attain an 
education; rather, it is the quality of education received. The primary issue is that 
there is a disconnect between educational offerings and market needs and 
expectations. If Afghan youth are not receiving an education that meets 
international standards, then it becomes a problem. They will be graduating, but 
because they have not received the proper training and acquired the necessary 
skills at the university to make them competitive, they will have limited 
employment prospects. University graduates disillusioned with their living 
conditions will gravitate towards three alternative courses of action: one, engage 
in protests to demand that the Afghan government address their grievances; two, 
leave the country to pursue greater opportunities; or three, join the insurgency 
out of frustration or desperation. 
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4. An Alternative to Higher Education: Madrassas  
Providing access to higher education is an important goal; however, 
according to Jim Miller, the reality is that many youth, particularly in Muslim 
countries, are unable to attend universities for a number of reasons, including 
financial constraints, failure to pass the Concord exams (university entry tests), 
and the state’s inability to accommodate the throngs applying.59 A report 
released by Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) states that in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the only alternative for these youth is to attend 
madrassas (religious schools).60 Existing literature often depicts madrassas in a 
negative light and as “hate factories.”61 Although madrassas claim to teach some 
secular subjects, the greatest emphasis is put on teaching the “Islamic value 
system, world view, and code of conduct.”62 While ideally this is not a problem, 
because many madrassas provide educational services in places a developing 
state cannot reach, a new version of political Islam has found its way into some 
of these schools. 
Radical political Islam is a significant problem in Afghanistan. According to 
Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand province in Afghanistan, “the new 
generation of teachers exiled in Pakistan” have brought with them a rigid version 
of Islam that “brainwash[es] students and teach[es] them religious extremism, 
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[and] armed jihad.”63 As Fuller argues, madrassas in both countries are notorious 
for promulgating anti-Western and anti-state sentiments, as well as condoning 
violence.64 The spread of anti-state sentiments among the young can affect their 
desire to seek tertiary education in the future. Rather than scouting for 
scholarships or trying to reapply to the university system the following year, 
youths can become radicalized in these madrassas and end up joining the 
insurgency.  
While it may be true that madrassas espouse extremist rhetoric and 
promote jihad, it is also important to consider, as Jack A. Goldstone argues, that 
disillusioned youth in Muslim countries often turn to Islam to establish a sense of 
identity that goes beyond their financial or social status.65 Because these youth 
are not able to improve their social status in this world, the hope is that they can 
earn rewards in the next world.66 Consequently, militant groups exploit Muslim 
youths’ newfound religiosity. According to Gunnar Heinsohn, the German social 
scientist who first coined “youth bulge” in the 1990s, Muslim youths are 
especially vulnerable to rigid and draconian strands of Islam.67 Fuller agrees, but 
argues that while in the 19th and 20th centuries, Arab nationalism or Marxism-
Leninism prevailed, and both encouraged extremist rhetoric in response to social 
grievances, Islamic fundamentalism has now gained significant traction with 
Muslim youths and has served as the primary vehicle for radicalization.68 Fareed 
Zakaria postulates that the amalgamation of the youth bulge, stagnant 
economies, and social change have created the perfect storm for a militant 
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Islamic resurgence in the Muslim world.69 It is worth noting that thirteen of the 
twenty-seven largest youth-bulge societies are Muslim countries.70 
Fuller’s theory that a desire for swift justice and willingness to initiate any 
action to achieve it is therefore more applicable than Fraser’s theory, which 
states that youth, especially if they are younger than twenty, are drawn to 
radicalism due to an “underdeveloped death concept.” In other words, youth 
cannot psychologically comprehend or understand the gravity of death.71 Fuller 
states that societies incapable of carrying out justice often stimulate radicalized 
action, particularly among the young. This situation arises, Fuller believes, in part 
because “youth have far less to lose, are less patient, less cautious, and are 
more susceptible to overdrawn and simplistic radical analyses of existing social 
problems, their source and solution.”72  
Youth grievances and feelings of injustice are serious concerns in 
Afghanistan. Afghan youth in rural provinces such as Khost are increasingly 
joining Islamist groups and insurgencies over perceived and real grievances. 
Their activities include “night raids and the killing and detention of villagers” and 
expressing overall dissatisfaction with the Afghan government’s ability to improve 
economic conditions and educational opportunities.73 Basically, the government’s 
failure to carry out justice and provide opportunities often compels youth in these 
conservative regions to seek alternative leaders whom they perceive as more 
capable.74 While this is perceived as conservatism, lack of effective government 
policy regarding education and employment may be playing a significant role. 
Realizing this, the Afghan government, rather than shut the madrassas down, in 
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2008, it tried to incorporate them into the state education system. Hanif Atmar the 
education minister explained why the government took such a route: 
 We are critical of policies in the past. Actually it was a result of 
those policies to exclude these madrassas, keep them on the 
margin of the society, and then entirely hand them over to the 
fundamentalists.75 
The reform required that madrassas teach subjects related to Islam 40 
percent of the time, but the remaining 60 percent would include basic subjects 
such as math, geography, science, and literature. Many madrassas fervently 
opposed the reform, arguing that the primary focus should be reciting and 
memorizing the Quran, and there simply was not enough time to work on non-
Islamic subjects. Despite its efforts, the Afghan government continues to struggle 
in bringing madrassas into the state system because of the pushback from the 
conservative mullahs at the madrassas who want to remain autonomous. Lack of 
funding and capability, as well as a coherent strategy has been the primary 
reasons. 
5. Response to Lack of Access to Quality Higher Education: 
Peaceful Protests 
According to Ferguson, two things often occur when there are limited 
socioeconomic opportunities: violence and exit. Ferguson fails to mention a third 
option: engagement in peaceful protest and political activism within the country. 
Fuller properly articulates that just because youth, specifically those who are 
educated, are limited in social mobility, does not automatically mean they will turn 
to militancy or flee the country. He states that the presence of cohorts of 
educated youth leads to increased “political expectations and demands on the 
part of a student population who will challenge more aggressively the 
weaknesses and failures of the state and its leaders.”76 He further argues that 
educated youths are pivotal in challenging the status quo; in the Arab Spring, 
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“youth played a central role in sparking [peaceful] protest movements across the 
Middle East,” which eventually brought down over 40 years of dictatorship.77 
Stephanie Schwartz argues that youth in conflict-prone countries such as 
Afghanistan should not be pigeonholed as either destabilizers or passive victims. 
She posits that, instead, youth can serve as agents of change, leaders in peace 
building, and contributors to the reconstruction process.78 This can certainly be 
the case among Afghan youth in Afghanistan. In fact, the question that emerges 
is how can policy present them from going from peaceful protests to radical 
behavior and what role is the educational policy playing in this. 
Afghan youth have historically played a pivotal role in challenging the 
status quo by engaging in protests to demand for change. Afghan university 
students in Kabul, Heart, Mazar-e-Sharif, Bamiyan, and Faryab are currently 
street leading demonstrations demanding that the government address the 
challenges youth are facing, including lack of access to quality education, limited 
employment opportunities, and security concerns.79 Afghan youth are also at the 
forefront of political engagement, as evidenced by their massive turnout in the 
2014 presidential elections. Although the Taliban vowed to “violently disrupt the 
elections, in part by reprising a 2009 tactic of attacking people with blue ink on 
their finger,” Afghan youth went to the polling stations in large numbers. One 
week before the elections, representatives of the Kabul-based Youth Activist 
Network for Reform and Change (YARC), “an umbrella organization of social and 
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civil-society groups that includes some 300,000 members, inked their fingers to 
encourage Afghans to participate in the election despite Taliban threats.”80 
 Although Afghan youth are not monolithic, many educated youth are 
engaging in the political process to bring about stability and economic and social 
opportunities for other youth in the country. In March 2014, Afghanistan’s election 
commission “reported that young people constituted a staggering 70 percent of 
provincial council candidates across the country (YARC itself has put forward 
more than 35 candidates for provincial councils).”81 These educated youths are 
paving the future for Afghanistan and, as articulated by Fuller and Schwartz, they 
have not resorted to violence or joined the insurgency. Instead, they have 
expressed their concerns through peaceful protest and active political 
engagement. While these youths have chosen to take a different route to 
address their grievances, there remains a large number of Afghan youth who are 
not so willing and patient.  
6. The Exit Option 
Lack of educational and job opportunities, as Ferguson points out, has led 
to mass—and often illegal—migrations of young people to neighboring countries. 
Essentially, in war-torn or post-conflict countries, when promises of development 
collapse, mass exits can ensue.82 Yukitoshi Matsumoto points to Afghan youths 
in particular, who have begun flocking to neighboring Pakistan and Iran in hopes 
of a better future. Matsumoto’s research finds that Afghan youths often seek jobs 
at the UN, not for the purpose of nation building, but to form beneficial affiliations 
that increase the likelihood of receiving foreign visas that will allow them to 
permanently leave the country.83 This exodus depletes the country of the 
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educated youth who can potentially contribute to economic development and 
stability in the country.84 Often, the individuals left in in post-conflict countries are 
warlords and impoverished people, who, according to Sam Weir, have limited 
ability to bring development and peace.85 Since young, intellectually capable 
individuals are needed to rebuild a country, particularly in post-conflict regions, 
their flight cripples development. 
7. Final Notes 
As stated earlier, higher education is of paramount importance in the 
development of third-world countries; however, Bilal Barakat and Henrik Urdal 
argue that the state has to be cognizant of the ramifications of expanding access 
to higher education at a rapid pace without a coherent plan.86 Alan Richards and 
John Waterbury similarly state that the biggest challenge Muslim countries face 
is their inability to absorb university enrollments. The rapid expansion of 
universities has resulted in major problems, such as overcrowding, which hinders 
the overall learning environment.87 In addition, Fuller argues that Afghan 
curricula fail to provide adequate technical and training skills to prepare students 
for the economy of a modern country. He asserts that poor education often 
translates to an inferior workforce that hampers the economy and offers minimal 
interest to foreign investors. This circumstance, in turn, inhibits the country’s 
ability to integrate and compete globally.88 While this may explain why youth are 
unable to acquire jobs, it is not clear in Afghanistan whether the job market is 
also providing pertinent employment as the country is rebuilding its war-ridden 
economy. Although the aforementioned authors describe the problem, they offer 
few policy prescriptions.  
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Jorrit Karaminga provides the most significant recommendation, and that 
is for the United States to focus less on the Afghan National Army and police, 
which often comprise young, illiterate recruits, and more on the youth who have 
potential to be the future leaders of Afghanistan.89 He argues that the U.S. 
strategy within the past decade has been to get Afghan security forces to 
effectively take over security control in 2014. Consequently, other cohorts of 
young people have been severely neglected. He suggests investing in foreign 
language and IT courses, as well as “better professional training for teachers, 
and schools and universities that are more ‘plugged in’ to the international 
academic system.”90 This is certainly a step in the right direction, because 
language fluency, particularly in English, makes youth more competitive in the 
market.  
All in all, the existing literature provides a rich understanding of the 
challenges to higher education in developing countries, and the implications of 
the youth bulge are comprehensively covered. Whereas much of the literature 
emphasizes the importance of universal access to higher education for youth, 
practical recommendations for improving the quality of and access to higher 
education fall short, and there is no order of importance outlined for primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education. While touting universal policy prescriptions for 
improving higher education is an easy task, its successful application is a 
completely different matter. Addressing the youth bulge in Afghanistan requires a 
multifaceted approach tailored to the country. It requires methods that not only 
improve access to higher education, but also quality, so that university graduates 
are well trained and equipped to compete successfully in the job market.  
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II. HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN  
This chapter provides a brief history of Afghanistan’s political and 
educational system from the 1930s onward, demonstrating how, from the 1970s, 
the changing regimes historically focused on higher education as a means of 
inculcating youth with a specific ideology. Also examined is how Afghan youth 
have deposed governments or induced instability if their needs were not met in 
the past. Education policy after 2001 is discussed, as well as government 
successes, including increased enrollment and facilities. This chapter concludes 
by arguing that the current government has made some improvements to higher 
education in Afghanistan, but much more is still needed, especially since 
Afghanistan is experiencing a youth bulge. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
Higher education in Afghanistan was not established until 1932, when 
King Mohamad Zahir Shah’s father, Mohammad Nadir Shah, created the first 
faculty of physical sciences at Kabul University.91 Later under King Zahir Shah, 
higher education became a priority. Kabul University was the first public 
university built in 1946. It was established with the help of Turkish professor 
Fagih Kamil Baig, who created additional faculties, including medicine and 
agriculture. During the Cold War, Afghanistan accepted both Russian and 
Western aid and became one of the “premiere universities in the region.”92 
Students who passed their exams during their senior year were often sent 
abroad to France, Germany, Turkey, and England to advance their studies.93 
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Initially, admittance to the Afghan universities was often restricted to members of 
the aristocracy and other government officials.94 As time progressed, however, 
non-aristocratic students gained more access and education became more 
accessible to the general population.95 
By 1950, the Afghan government had made tremendous advancements in 
expanding access and improving the quality of higher education.96 Systematic 
planning of education began in 1956 and was referred to as the first five-year 
educational-development plan (1956–1961), in which the focus was improving 
primary education. As the need for human resources increased, the Afghan 
government initiated the second five-year plan (1962–1967), which focused on 
technical and higher education. From 1964 onward, education from the primary 
to university level was free and funded by the Afghan government.97 Free tuition 
greatly expanded access, and more than “20 percent of the students received 
free books, stipends and other school materials.”98 More importantly, “education 
opportunities were made available to all, irrespective of gender, race, religion, or 
social class.”99  
In 1963, the Afghan government established a second public institution, 
Nangarhar University. Both Pashto and English were the languages of 
instruction. The third university, Polytechnical University, was created in 1969 
with Soviet assistance and included three faculties: construction, electro-
mechanics, and geology. By the late 1960s, Afghan professors and academics 
developed more than 350 textbooks and teaching materials.100 The following 
decade, many more universities were established, with international help from 
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universities in France, Germany, and America, including Columbia University, 
Indiana University, University of Wyoming, and the University of Nebraska.101 
Consequently, from 1956 to 1972, student enrollment ballooned from 760 to 
6,600 at both Kabul and Polytechnical universities.102 Educational institutions 
were gradually increasing in number and were embraced by the majority of 
Afghans until the government’s dramatic political shift to Communism in the 
1970s.  
While the Afghan government continued to expand the university system, 
popular discontent was brewing among the Afghan people, especially the youth. 
Many high-school students in urban areas were being turned away because of 
the government’s inability to absorb them into the university system. University 
graduates fared no better, because of the grim employment prospects after 
graduation. By 1973, more than 20,000 high-school students graduated per year, 
but less than half could gain admission to universities or post-secondary 
schools.103 This was in part because of “faulty planning and structural 
inadequacies.”104 In Kabul University, more than 12,000 high school graduates 
competed for about 3,000 slots. To curb pressure on the educational system, the 
Afghan government implemented the French-derived Concord examination.105 
The new implementation of the Concord exam did not address the problem of an 
influx of students applying to universities, however.  
In 1973, Daoud Khan, King Zahir Shah’s brother-in-law, led a bloodless 
coup d’etat against the monarchy in response to student unrest and resentment 
among the educated class over unemployment. Daoud Khan deposed the 
monarchy, abolished the constitution of 1964, and installed himself as president 
and foreign minister. After his announcement of a policy of nonalignment (in 
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keeping with Afghan tradition), relations with the neighboring Soviet Union began 
to strain, and Daoud Khan pursued a campaign against Afghan communists. The 
assassination of a leading Afghan Communist Party leader in early April 1978 
motivated communists in the government to launch a campaign against the 
Daoud regime. 
B. INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE  
 In May 1978, Daoud Khan was ousted by the People’s Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA), led by Nur Muhammad Taraki. In December 1978, Taraki 
signed a 20-year “friendship treaty” with the Soviet Union, which dramatically 
increased Soviet assistance to Afghanistan. Taraki also implemented radical 
Marxist-style reforms, including land reforms, and increased women’s rights.106 
His drastic changes, to education in particular, completely alienated traditional 
segments of Afghan society. Afghans who were initially willing to let their kids 
attend university eventually began pulling them out as Taraki called for increased 
liberalization that ran counter to deep cultural and religious practices.107 Despite 
pushback from conservative and traditional Afghans, Taraki pressed the Soviet 
model of education, which focused on secularism and Marxist philosophy. By the 
mid-1970s, “Soviet educational ideologies permeated Afghan institutions.”108 
Resentment and opposition to the Afghan government by the majority Afghan 
population reached a boiling point before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 
1979.109  
1. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979)  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the decade-long war that 
ensued significantly disrupted learning at the university level. Universities 
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accused of siding with the insurgency or with the Soviets were targeted both by 
mujahdaeen factions (freedom fighters who were anti-Communist and pro-
Islamist) and Soviet forces. As the battle raged on, by 1984, overall enrollment 
dropped by more than 300,000—from one million to 700,000.110 Despite the 
continuous fighting and high dropout rates, the Afghan government continued to 
pursue the previous policy of imparting free education and did manage to keep 
the prominent universities intact. Under President Babrak Karmal, literacy 
courses and health and technology programs remained and the “Russian 
language replaced English as the international language.”111  
During Soviet rule, new universities were also established. President 
Muhammad Najibullah, who became the country’s fifth president in 1986, opened 
three new universities in Balkh, (1986), Herat (1988), and Kandahar (1991). 
Although the universities were open, the quality of learning was suspect. 
Student-to-teacher ratios varied widely, and the Soviet-influenced curricula, 
mixing of three age groups into single classes, and lack of protection against 
mujahedeen attacks all created problems.112 Because the Soviets had direct 
control over university curricula, significant changes were introduced in the social 
sciences, theology, economics, and law.113 By the early 1980s, the university 
curriculum emulated Soviet pedagogy completely. Initially, the curriculum was a 
mix of the old Afghan curriculum and Russian textbooks; however, the curricula 
began to emphasize “communist internationalism” as a means of promulgating 
communist ideology among the younger generation. New subjects including 
“historical materialism, the revolutionary history of workers, [the] history of 
Russia, [and] Spain” were introduced and any Islamic courses discussing jihad 
were omitted entirely.114 By 1983, more than 20,000 Afghan students were 
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forcibly sent to the USSR annually for vocational training and education.115 
Soviet instructors and Eastern-bloc specialists replaced Afghan professors, who 
fled the country by the thousands or were executed if they defied the Soviet style 
of education. The Afghanistan Education Committee (AEC), an NGO for refugees 
established in Peshawar in 1983, accused the Soviets of “Russian colonialism 
and exploitation” through the Afghan curricula. According to AEC: 
Afghan teachers are forced to teach the students in such a 
way…against their culture and belief…. They introduce several new 
subjects of communism and socialism in various faculties and 
schools. They, directly, or indirectly, have been forced to learn 
Russian languages. Every day teachers should say in classes 
something in favor of Russian friendship with Afghanistan.116  
By 1988, near the end of the war, more than 31,019 Afghan teachers and 
professors from all educational levels had either fled the country or been 
executed.117  
2. The Afghan Civil War (1992–1996) 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the Afghan 
government transferred power to the Islamic Jihad Council (IJC), in 1992. 
Mujahadeen factions, including the Northern Alliance (Jamiat-e-Islami), Hezb-e-
Islami, Hezb-e-Wahdat and Hezb-e-Jumbesh were unable to find common 
ground, however, and rival warlords plunged the country into civil war. The 
universities initially remained open, but as warring mujahadeen factions 
frequently targeted university buildings, schools began closing. Furniture, 
materials, and electric wiring were ransacked from the universities. Libraries 
were looted and many textbooks that were considered “Soviet influenced” were 
burned or discarded.118.  
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The universities that remained were morphed by mujahedeen groups into 
“factional education departments,” with various degrees of Islamic religiosity. 
While some mujahedeen leaders, including Ahmad Shah Massoud and 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, endorsed a more moderate version of Islam, others, 
including Abdul Rasoul Sayaf and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, subscribed to a hardline 
version of Salafi or Wahabi Islam.119 The latter group received tremendous 
funding from oil- rich states such as Saudi Arabia and was therefore able to exert 
more influence over higher education. For instance, the “language of jihad was 
incorporated throughout the curriculum,” social-science textbooks began to 
emphasize Saudi/Muslim history, and math books included questions such as, 
“one year a group of mujahedeen spent 124,800 Afghanis. What was their 
monthly expenditure?”120  
By 1993, much of the Soviet-influenced curricula that had previously been 
used was replaced with Islamized versions. Many of the higher education 
institutes that were based in Peshawar during the Soviet war were later 
transferred to Afghanistan. The Islamic University was established in Peshawar 
by Hikmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami in 1989 and later transferred to Afghanistan’s 
Khost province. It initially had faculties of education and medicine, but later 
offered degrees in engineering, agriculture, literature and Sharia. In 2003, it 
became Khost University and continues to exist under the same name.121 
Another college initially located in Peshawar was Abdullah Bin Masoud 
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University. It was established by Rabbani’s Jamiat-e-Islami in 1991 and included 
a faculty in Sharia. Relocated to the Takhar province of Afghanistan, it continues 
to operate as Takhar University and has expanded its faculties to permit degrees 
in medicine, law, science, education, and computer science.122  
3. Taliban Rule (1996–2001) 
 The civil war raged on until 1996, when the Taliban seized control of 
Kabul. The Taliban, meaning “students” in Arabic, emerged subsequent to the 
Soviet war as hundreds of thousands of Afghans fled Afghanistan to Peshawar in 
northwest Pakistan. The only form of education available was the hardline 
madrassas funded by Pakistani intelligence (Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI), 
Saudi Arabia, and the United States (by proxy).123 The Taliban, therefore, “were 
completely entrenched in a belief system that derided democracy and freedom in 
favor of strict, seventh-century fundamentalist Islam.”124 Despite their rigid views, 
the Afghan people initially embraced them because they were exhausted from 
two decades of war and instability. The Taliban were especially welcome in 
Pashtun-dominated areas, because “their belief system was in basic alignment 
with already existing tribal customs.”125 
Taliban rule (1996–2001) only worsened the state of higher education in 
Afghanistan. Fourteen universities were functioning when the Taliban usurped 
power; that number was reduced to seven during Taliban rule.126 The universities 
that managed to remain were Kabul, the Polytechnical Institute, Medical 
University Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar, Kandahar, and the Academy of Islamic 
Disciplines and Technology, with campuses in Herat and Jalalabad. Universities 
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considered to be communist-leaning were burned down.127 No percentage of the 
national budget was allocated to higher education, considering the continuous 
civil war had constrained the economy. This led to a depletion of educational 
facilities such as libraries, laboratories, and other resources.128 Much of the 
general curriculum was abandoned as students were forced to memorize the 
Quran and concentrate solely on Islamic studies.129 Women were barred from 
attending school. Given the dearth of university teachers in classrooms, students 
began dropping out in high numbers.130 According to some reports, university 
student enrollment fell to less than 5,000 during Taliban rule.131 For those 
students who remained, the lack of facilities, libraries, and other resources 
severely inhibited learning. Students who protested the horrible conditions at 
school might be brutally assaulted by Taliban members.132 When students at 
Jalalabad University protested against conditions at the school, Taliban officials 
opened fire on them.133 Hazaras, in particular, faced brutal persecution by the 
Taliban “including a series of mass killings in northern Afghanistan, where 
thousands of Hazaras lost their lives or were forced to flee their homes.”134 As a 
consequence, the majority of Hazaras joined with the Northern Alliance that 
opposed the Taliban. Shia religiosity also increased in response to Taliban 
enforcement of Sunni practices.135 
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C. POST-2001 GIROA  
By the fall of the Taliban in 2001 under the U.S. allied and anti-Taliban 
Northern Alliance forces, more than 80 percent of Afghanistan’s universities and 
schools had been devastated or destroyed. The UN-sponsored Bonn conference 
in 2001 attempted to pave the way for reconstruction that “included the adoption 
of a new constitution, a presidential election in 2004, and the National Assembly 
election in 2005.”136 Hamid Karzai became the new democratically elected 
president of Afghanistan in 2004 and vowed to bring stability and restore 
education for both boys and girls.137  
1. Burgeoning Youth Programs  
By 2005, the Afghan government initiated many youth-based programs to 
address the needs of the vulnerable demographic. The MOHE, in collaboration 
with UNESCO and the World Bank, initiated a five-year national higher-education 
strategic plan, which sought to rectify problems and address challenges after 
nearly three decades of neglect.138 The Afghan government also established the 
Afghan Ministry of Youth Affairs (AMYA) within the Ministry of Information and 
Culture, and tasked it to coordinate youth-oriented programs. To complement 
AMYA, in 2007, the Afghan government, in collaboration with UN agencies, 
launched the National Joint Youth Program (NJYP) as a means of: 
 …strengthening the capacity of the Government to respond to the 
needs of the youth of the country, promoting non-formal education, 
increasing awareness and developing skills (literacy, leadership, 
strategic planning, conflict resolution, peace-building, etc.) in young 
people so as to provide better quality of life and livelihood 
opportunities, engaging youth in governance, development and 
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social-political processes at local, district, municipal, provincial and 
national level, ensuring the participation of young women and men 
in democracy and advocacy and promoting volunteerism for peace 
and development and establishing a youth volunteer corps for 
Afghanistan.139 
 NJYP lasted until 2009 and was later replaced by the Afghan National 
Youth Policy  (ANYP), which was presented to President Karzai in May 2013. 
ANYP is a programmatic document that includes feedback from more than 500 
Afghan youth. The policy outlined legislative strategies “to systematically 
address, short, medium, and long-term youth issues.”140 The priority target 
groups for ANYP include, but are not limited to, young women and girls, 
unemployed and underemployed youth, rural youth, extremist youth, 
marginalized youth, and youth with no access to education.141 The results of 
ANYP have yet to be seen, as it has only been recently implemented. But as far 
as higher education is concerned, the Afghan government has made some 
progress.  
2.  Increased Enrollment and Public Universities  
By 2009, 22 universities received more than $35 million in aid, averaging 
$1.5 million per university.142 The primary goals for MOHE were to improve the 
“standard of education provision of required facilities in educational institutes, 
capacity building, taking measures to maintain the standard, and efforts to reform 
the syllabus.”143 Other objectives included creating a total of 34 institutions in the 
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capital cities of the 34 provinces, to offer two years of technical and professional 
education; increasing the number of professors holding PhDs to 20 percent and 
master’s degrees to 50 per cent by 2016; and promoting information-technology 
centers in all the universities.144 As of August 2012, “there were more than 91 
higher institutes, of which 31 were public (17 universities and 14 higher education 
institutes) and 70 were private higher educational institutes.”145 Such ambitious 
accomplishments have attracted many students, and university applications have 
increased at staggering rates. From 2001 to 2012, enrollment expanded from 
8,000 students to 100,000 in public universities and institutes of higher 
learning.146 The number of high-school graduates is expected to grow more than 
three times, from approximately 75,000 in 2008 to more than 230,000 in 2014.147 
Of those graduates, more than a fifth are female.  
3. Attempts to Revise Curricula 
In early 2003, the interim government’s ministry of education, in 
collaboration with USAID, UNICEF, and UNESCO, created a draft of the 
university curriculum that reflected the country’s new emphasis on “social justice, 
protection of human dignity, protection of human rights, [and] the realization of 
democracy.”148 Curriculum Framework Afghanistan (2003) also emphasized that 
implementing the new curriculum would mean Afghan youth would be “good 
Muslims, civilized human beings and true, self-reliant Afghans.”149 Despite 
promises to establish a new curriculum that reflected the aforementioned ideas, 
USAID and other NGOs  
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…simply re-printed old textbooks from the 1980s created at the 
Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at 
Omaha (with the help of the CIA) that couched math problems in 
terms of killing Soviets, contained numerous pictures of guns and 
bullets, detailed the history of Saudi Arabia not Afghanistan, and 
read more like a jihadist manual than a children’s school 
textbook.150 
 University curriculums were also reprinted and contained extremely 
outdated content—especially in the fields of medicine, engineering, and 
technology—that was unresponsive to labor-market needs and future 
employment for graduates.151  
In 2011, the MoHE “appointed a committee of university professors and 
other stakeholders to review the curriculum and produce a guidebook to change 
the curriculum based on labour market needs.”152 The MoHE invited Afghan and 
international scholars to participate in month-long seminars to develop university 
curriculums that would meet international standards and enable students to 
compete in the market economy. The new curriculums were also supposed to be 
sensitive to Afghan “religio-cultural and social values.”153 The Afghan university 
curriculum has yet to be updated, due primarily to the unavailability of textbooks 
in the native Dari and Pashto languages combined with “teachers who do not 
have the ability to consult the books published in other languages.”154  
D. CONCLUSION 
Afghanistan has endured more than three decades of war, and the 
universities have borne the brunt by being at the center of disputes among 
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political groups. Improving the educational system in Afghanistan will not 
miraculously happen overnight. Afghan youth have been the pawns of 
government regimes that have tried to impose their ideology onto the group. 
Islam has always been a way of life for Afghans, and when they feel their religion 
or culture is coming under attack, they will defend it to the core.155 Despite Soviet 
attempts in the 1970s to influence Afghan youth through the educational system, 
Afghans united against the “Soviet style” teaching that went against the mores of 
their society, Although youth are currently going back to school at staggering 
rates, there remains a historical distrust of the government because it is 
perceived as propagating a particular ideology. The goal of the Afghan 
government should be to provide quality higher education that provides youth 
with the necessarily skills to compete in the job market. The focus should not be 
to tout a specific ideology, especially if goes against Afghan cultural and religious 
beliefs.   
Although the MoHE has made significant advancements in higher 
education after 2001, many challenges remain for the government. Not only must 
the educational system avoid promoting an ideology that offends cultural and 
religious beliefs, but the government must also recognize that providing access 
to education at a broad level requires a coherent strategy. Afghan history 
demonstrates that being unable to absorb increased student enrollment and 
turning out university graduates with limited skills poses significant problems to 
the political system. Afghan youth may become disillusioned with grim 
employment prospects after graduation and induce instability. Given the current 
youth bulge in Afghanistan, the government must provide high-quality education 
that allows youth to compete in the job market.  
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III. THE U.S. IMPACT ON HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
AFGHANISTAN   
This chapter provides a brief examination of U.S.–Afghan relations since 
the 1960s and their implications for the higher-education system. Of particular 
significance are U.S. support of Islamic education as a foreign-policy tool to deter 
Soviet influence in the region. The United States has historically “cast Islam as a 
pedagogical vehicle to inspire and mobilize resistance during times of war, or 
Islam as the sword.”156 Presently, many U.S.-funded educational initiatives in 
Afghanistan seek to reduce Islamic extremism through curricula, which is based 
within an Islamic context. Essentially, the United States wants to blend Western 
values with Islam to stimulate economic development and social change along 
free-market-friendly lines. The problem is that the United States has focused 
primarily on improving education at the primary and secondary levels and this is 
a problem because college aged youth are the ones seeking future opportunities. 
Although the U.S. has invested significantly in American University of 
Afghanistan (AUAf), it has for the most part neglected public universities, which 
are in dire need of assistance. The U.S. failure to focus on Afghan youth at public 
universities can potentially exacerbate the youth bulge problem in the country.  
A. U.S. AND AFGHAN RELATIONS BEFORE 2001 
Among South Asian countries, Afghanistan has the longest-standing 
diplomatic relations with the United States. The United States recognized 
Afghanistan in 1921 and established diplomatic relations in 1935. While U.S. 
interests in Afghanistan were initially limited, Kabul acquired strategic importance 
beginning in World War II. The United States’ policy in Afghanistan was 
consistent through the Cold War: to counter “excessive Soviet influence” in the 
country and maintain a power balance. The focal point was not necessarily 
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Afghanistan itself, but more so the surrounding areas, such as the ports of the 
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, that were deemed critical.157  
From the 1950s to 1979, the United States provided significant financial 
assistance to Afghanistan, giving more than “$500 million in loans, grants, and 
surplus agricultural commodities to develop transportation facilities, increase 
agricultural production, expand the educational system, stimulate industry, and 
improve government administration.”158 Basically, the United States used 
development assistance as a means of promoting ideological objectives. Before 
the Soviet war, a team of Columbia University professors collaborated with the 
MoE for more than two decades to reform and “modernize” the education system 
in Afghanistan by focusing on curriculum development and teacher training.159 
More importantly, the Columbia team attempted to incorporate Islam into the 
curricula, but also to infuse them with Western concepts. Other American 
universities, including the universities of Wyoming and Nebraska, also became 
involved in partnerships in Afghanistan.  
B. THE SOVIET INTERLUDE IN AFGHANISTAN  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in a deterioration in 
U.S.–Afghan relations. While the U.S. terminated any sort of bilateral assistance, 
it heavily financed mujahedeen groups stationed in the Pakistani border on the 
Durand Line.160 Pakistan’s state security service, the Inter-Services Intelligence 
agency (ISI), served as the CIA’s primary conduit for funding these groups. To 
counter Soviet influence in the country, the U.S. spent millions of dollars to create 
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schoolbooks that were filled with “violent images and militant Islamic 
teaching.”161 From 1986 to 1992, USAID oversaw a $50-million contract with the 
Education Center for Afghanistan (ECA) that produced textbooks “that were 
polemical and fiercely critical of the Soviet Union and promoted Islam through 
violence.”162 At primary and secondary schools, texts instructed children that, 
“alef is for Allah, jim is for jihad, and shin is for Shakir, who conducts jihad with 
his sword.”163 Jihad essentially became entrenched within the curricula.   
The three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan who attended U.S.-funded 
madrassas were also inculcated with hardline Islamic teachings, and many of 
these madrassas were accused of serving as “incubators for violent 
extremism.”164 Between 1986 and 1989, U.S. aid increased to more than $600 
million annually, which was matched by Saudi contributions.165 In 1981, the 
United States pressed other countries to help with the refugee cause. The United 
States’ decision to get other countries involved because if refugee financing 
became too transparent, it “would damage the credibility of the muja[hadeen] by 
focusing attention on U.S. influence in the Afghan insurgency.”166 Numerous 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) agreed to assist refugees as long as 
they were given the proper resources to do so. The United States financed only 
those NGOs that it favored and encouraged other countries to either fund the 
same or to contribute to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR).167 Ultimately, most aid went to mujahedeen factions, providing these 
groups “with significant political leverage over the millions of Afghan exiles.”168 
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Many dislocated Afghan youth, therefore, grew indoctrinated with Islamic 
extremism and a culture of war.  
After the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan in 1989, U.S. interest in 
the region plummeted. In the 1990s and during the Clinton administration, the 
U.S. paid little attention to the country as it plunged into civil war. The tragedy of 
September 11 brought Afghanistan back into the U.S. spotlight. By the end of 
2001, the United States and the international community formed a military 
coalition to dismantle al-Qaida and its safe havens by ousting the Taliban from 
power. Also in response to the attacks, the Bush Administration declared a war 
on terrorism, accompanied by a policy of “winning the hearts and minds of the 
Muslim world” through humanitarian assistance.169  
C. U.S.–AFGHAN RELATIONS AFTER 2001 
After the fall of the Taliban, U.S. aid organizations including UNESCO and 
USAID quickly began to reconstruct the education system in Afghanistan. In 
February 2002, women were allowed once again to enroll in university after six 
years of forbiddance during the Taliban era. With UNESCO assistance, more 
than 1,000 female students took the Concord exam to gain admittance to a 
university.170 USAID also greatly contributed to improving the university 
education system and “obligated millions in construction projects for dormitories 
and teacher training.”171 As a result, enrollment increased from a reported 4,000 
students in 2001 to 37,000 by 2004.172 
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By the end of 2002, numerous U.S. aid organizations, including USAID, 
UNESCO, and UNICEF, sought to draft a “new curricular framework” that 
incorporated Western-influenced ideals of “national unity, human rights, and 
democracy.”173 Through consultation with the interim government’s MoE, the 
2003 Curriculum Framework Afghanistan was established, emphasizing that 
“when young people enter the world of work, as a result of the implementation of 
the new curriculum, they will be good Muslims, civilized human beings and true, 
self-reliant Afghans.”174  
There were, however, significant problems related to the curricula at the 
primary and secondary level. USAID merely reprinted textbooks used during the 
1980s and 1990, which focused on themes of “jihad and violent struggle against 
external enemy forces.”175 More than 15 million copies made their way into 
Afghanistan.176 The reprinting of jihadi entrenched curricula demonstrates that it 
is not just education that matters, but also the type of education. Islamic 
education comes in various forms and the focus on books from the Afghan Soviet 
war is highly problematic and needs to be altered.  
D. TODAY 
The new Afghan curricula now used in primary and secondary schools 
have been revised to introduce conflict resolution and peace-building ideas within 
an Islamic context. Moreover, in primary and secondary schools, much of the 
social-science curricula focuses on “self-determination, political pluralism, and 
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individual rights.”177 The emphasis is also more on competition rather than broad 
social cooperation. Although Islamic precepts focus on “communal solidarity, 
social justice, faith and cultural pluralism,” the goal has been to converge 
Western and Islamic values in the curricula.178 The textbooks amalgamate two 
disparate approaches to peace and conflict in that “while the strongest Western 
approach to conflict resolution is to conceptualize and solve problems, the 
Islamic approach emphasizes the mending and maintenance of social 
relationships.”179 Although the United States has made attempts to converge 
Islamic and Western values to inculcate a new generation of Afghans, the reality 
is that they do not always blend comfortably. In May 2012, more than 200 male 
students held protests at Kabul University in response to proposed legislation 
that would criminalize violence against women. The law would have included a 
ban on child and forced marriage, made domestic violence a crime, and stated 
rape victims could not be prosecuted for adultery. It would also have outlawed 
ba’ad, a traditional practice of exchanging women or girls to settle disputes or 
debts.180 Male students protested and argued that the decree was being 
“imposed by foreigners” and broke Islamic Shariah law.181 The bill was eventually 
rejected after fierce opposition from conservative lawmakers. Such an incident 
demonstrates that Islamic or cultural values often supersede perceived Western 
ideas.  
At the university level, the United States has focused on public universities 
only at the margins. Instead, it has focused on the American University of 
Afghanistan (AUAf), established in 2004. AUAf is a nonprofit, non-sectarian 
institution that emphasizes a liberalized style of education and, unlike public 
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universities, allows “free inquiry and reasoned argument.”182 A mostly American 
faculty teaches undergraduate-degree programs in liberal arts as well as market-
driven fields such as business administration and information technology. AUAf 
recently initiated the university’s first Western-style MBA program in Afghanistan. 
The curriculum at AUAf is not predetermined. This is the opposite of public 
universities, which enroll students into “‘faculties,’ each with a highly specialized 
course of study that leads from the beginning to a predetermined professional 
degree”183 The university has produced more than eleven Fulbright scholars and 
has maintained partnerships with institutions such as Stanford Law School 
Georgetown University, University of California, and Thunderbird School of 
International Management to train Afghan youth in various fields.184 In 2014, 
AUAf was awarded a grant to launch the Kabul Business Accelerator, with the 
aim of supporting Afghan businesses in marketing, business-plan development, 
product review, and other economic ends.185  
AUAf has attracted many students because of its updated facilities, 
qualified teachers, and variety of subjects. Enrollment was initially 50 in 2004 and 
today there are more than 1,300 full and part-time students (500 in 
undergraduate degree programs and 800 taking short courses).186 Tuition at 
AUAf is $5,500 annually, but more than 70 percent of the students attending 
receive grants or other forms of financial aid.187 USAID has provided significant 
assistance to AUAf by obligating more than $90 million, out of $200 million for 
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higher education, to reform and update its curriculum.188 Because of USAID 
funding, faulty salaries are “competitive with those at Western universities” unlike 
public universities, which pay professors $500 a month.189  
While AUAf has received significant U.S. attention, there has been little 
focus on public universities. In 2005, USAID established the Strengthening of 
Higher Education Project (SHEP), a $40 million attempt to address the needs of 
public universities in Afghanistan by increasing lab facilities, completing 
construction of university infrastructure, and revising outdated curricula in twelve 
SHEP partner universities (Kabul, Balkh, Herat, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Kabul 
Polytechnic, Bamiyan, Khost, Takhar, Jawzjan, Al-Beroni and Kabul Education 
University). By 2013, the World Bank reported that 97 out of 110 of the faculties 
in the twelve partner universities claimed to have revised their curricula.190  
While this was a great step, more than 20 public universities are still in 
need of revised curricula and upgraded facilities.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Foreign aid from the United States has been centered more on political 
strategy rather than sustainable, long-term change, especially with regard to 
higher education. Although the United States has focused on AUAf, it has largely 
ignored the needs of public universities, which are presently in crisis. Kabul 
University, which is a ten-minute drive from AUAf, can barely accommodate its 
20,000-student enrollment and continues to have languishing laboratories and 
facilities. Other public universities face similar problems and challenges that the 
United States has disregarded. As the United States teaches a new generation of 
Afghans to embrace democratic ideals at the primary and secondary level, as 
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well as at AUAf, it should not neglect the students enrolled at public universities, 
who constitute the majority of the student demographic and are most susceptible 
to becoming radicalized and joining an insurgency.  
As public universities continue to face enormous challenges because of 
lack of funding, the United States needs to reevaluate its aid distribution in higher 
education. The youth bulge can potentially destabilize Afghanistan, with 
repercussions for the United States, if the majority of Afghan youth feel their 
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IV. CHALLENGES IN HIGHER EDUCATION TODAY 
The Afghan government and the United States have made significant 
advancements in higher education, but there are still many challenges 
unaddressed. First, the state’s inability to absorb high-school students has 
resulted in the proliferation of private universities. While it is a positive thing that 
these institutions have absorbed rejected applicants, they are accused of existing 
to maximize profits and of not really assisting university graduates in obtaining 
jobs. Second, many university graduates from both public and private universities 
are not gaining the skills needed to be competitive in the job market because of 
poor infrastructure, outdated curricula, and unqualified teachers. Hence, 
unemployment is a big issue amongst Afghan university graduates. Religious 
radicalization in the universities is also a growing problem, especially in Pashtun-
dominated institutes and regions. 
Many who feel disillusioned about the university system and cannot find 
employment in Afghanistan have fled abroad to neighboring countries, including 
Pakistan, Iran, and India. Many others have attempted to go to Europe, often 
illegally. The mass exodus of Afghan youth to foreign lands has resulted in a 
brain drain. For Afghan youth who are unable to attain an education at public or 
private universities, madrassas remain a final option. Often, these madrassas 
espouse anti-U.S. sentiments and encourage disillusioned youth to adhere to an 
extremist version of Islam. Students attending these madrassas often end up 
joining the insurgency, not only from ideological conviction, but also because the 
Taliban and other militia groups offer hefty financial incentives.  
A. INABILITY TO ABSORB STUDENTS AND PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES 
Although the rapid rise in the number of students in primary and 
secondary education is a good thing, it also brings an increase in the pool of 
students who will demand higher education over the medium to long term. In 
Afghanistan, about 300,000 high school students graduate each year; yet, they 
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are competing for 60,000 openings in colleges and vocational and teacher-
training programs.191 In 2002, “the gross enrollment rate (GER) for primary 
school children was about 40 percent for girls and 86 percent for boys, 
respectively. By 2010, the GER had increased to 79 percent for girls and 114 
percent for boys, respectively.”192 Secondary school enrolment also increased for 
girls from six percent in 2003 to 30 percent in 2010, and for boys from 17 percent 
in 2003 to 60 percent in 2010.193 At present, about 171,000 students take the 
Concord examination, which concludes secondary education. Around 123,000 
students pass, and approximately 51,000 of these students are able to enter 
public universities, while around 25,000 enter private higher-education 
institutes.194  
Before 2007, applicants rejected by the public universities had four 
options: retake the exam the following year, apply for educational opportunities 
abroad, attend madrassas that offer degree programs, or give up.195 The shortfall 
in public higher-education spots and the growing ranks of unlucky applicants has 
resulted in a mass expansion of private-education companies. Compared to 
many other low-income countries, the private sector in Afghanistan has absorbed 
a relatively large number of students. Private universities and institutes are 
enrolling more than a third of all students.196  
As mentioned earlier, there are currently about 70 private institutions 
providing higher education in the country and about 74,000 students attend 
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them.197 These private institutions are expected to grow and have been 
marketing to students vigorously through “banners, billboards, television spots, 
and radio ads” that promise an “open educational environment, library and well-
equipped labs, and debate and thought exchange programs.”198 Among the 
pioneers was Kardan, which became the first licensed private higher-education 
institute in Afghanistan.199 Kardan is now a premiere institute, which more than 
6,000 students attending and obtaining degrees in business administration, 
political science, and economics. Afghan parliament members, deputy ministers, 
and other politicians have been known to attend classes to complete their 
education. 
Because of the paltry offerings and low standards of public universities, 
private institutes are considered a better option. According to Ilham Gharji, the 
chancellor of the private Gawharshad University, professors teaching at public 
universities often use “lecture notes that their professors inherited from their own 
professors years back, some as old as 30 years.”200 
The staggering increase of the loosely regulated private-higher-education 
sector has raised many concerns, however. Many students accuse these 
institutes of only seeking to maximize profits, with little regard for the quality of 
education. President Karzai has voiced concern about the intention of these 
universities, stating: 
In Britain, the United States, India, and elsewhere, private-
education standards are very high. The same level of standards 
can also be achieved in Afghanistan, but unfortunately, right now, 
[some of] these institutions are only there to earn money. Dear 
brothers and elders who have opened institutes for personal gain 
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and business, please go and earn your money by other means, but 
don’t dupe our children with bogus certificates.201  
One significant criticism is the courses offered by private universities. 
Many private universities churn out graduates whose new qualifications are “not 
in accordance with the market needs.”202 For instance, none of the private 
universities offer courses in agriculture, which are desperately needed in 
Afghanistan.203 And, unlike public universities, these private institutions and their 
degrees are not accredited by UNESCO or accepted around the world.204 A 
recent government audit of private institutions and universities concluded, “that 
none of the universities assessed met the stipulated criteria for ‘excellent.’” Only 
14 out of the 70 private universities were deemed “‘good,’ 42 ‘satisfactory’ with 
14 found to be ‘weak’ and put on a two-month probation.”205 
Many education officials, including the head of the MoHE, Suleiman 
Soroush, refute such claims. Mr. Soroush argues that while the quality of 
education in private institutions might not be superior to public universities, it is 
not worse.206 Kardan’s deputy chancellor, Mahmoud Dastagir, argues that the 
private sector is in its fledgling stage, and he “believes the institutes will be forced 
to improve” as market competition increases.207 While it may take a while for 
private universities to improve, they are still doling out university graduates who 
are unable to compete in the competitive job market. This in turn exacerbates the 
already existing unemployment problem. 
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B. POOR INFRASTRUCTURE  
During the past four decades, “higher education became highly politicized, 
ideologized, and sectarianized. Postsecondary campuses became war zones. 
The result was that the infrastructure was damaged, looted, or destroyed.”208 
Presently, the majority of university facilities are in sorry condition and unsuitable 
for modern teaching and learning. A large backlog of maintenance and repair 
exists, both for facilities and equipment. 209  
Many Afghan universities are extremely overcrowded and congested, 
while others operate in worn-down facilities. For instance, urban-centered 
universities, including Kabul and Heart, often exceed their classroom capacity. 
Students in Kabul and Herat Universities have held mass protests at being shut 
out of the public-university system due to lack of space and appalling facilities. 
Their primary complaint is that the universities lack even the most basic 
infrastructure such as bathrooms and dormitories (particularly for female 
students).210 
While higher-education institutions in Afghanistan provide libraries, there 
are limited books, computer labs, transportation options, laboratories, Internet, 
and parking facilities. The infrastructure for higher education has not recovered, 
and there is a lack of safe drinking water and reliable electricity. Many of these 
problems persist because national budget allocation to higher education 
decreased from $4 million in 2009 to $3.1 million in 2010.211 USAID has primarily 
obligated its educational funds at the primary and secondary level and to AUAf. 
According to Action Aid, an international organization that combats world poverty, 
the other problem is that between 70 and 80 percent of foreign assistance to 
Afghanistan has been “phantom aid,” meaning that people in dire need of funds 
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never actually receive it, either because the money goes straight to contractor 
salaries and overhead costs or is used to purchase goods and services from the 
donor country, regardless of whether cheaper services are available.212 
Professors at Kabul University have lamented the shortage of basic teaching aids 
such as blackboards, whiteboards, markers, and chalk.213 Other universities, 
including Herat and Khost, complain of inadequate computer labs, electricity, 
safe drinking water, parking facilities, and laboratories. In those labs that exist, 
the required materials and equipment are generally missing.214  
C. OUTDATED CURRICULA 
Another challenge to the higher-education system is the severely outdated 
curricula in Afghan universities. The state-mandated curriculum has not been 
updated in the 20 years since mujahadeen rule. Many public universities would 
therefore not “qualify as tertiary-level institutions by established international 
norms and standards.”215 Students are not exposed to up-to-date information 
regarding science, medicine, engineering, and technology.216  
As mentioned earlier, the United States has focused primarily on 
improving the curricula at the primary and secondary level, so that Afghan 
children no longer learn an extremist version of Islam, not on the tertiary level. 
Similarly, the Afghan government has embarked on a mission to create a 
national Islamic-education program for nation-building purposes and to appease 
religiously conservative Afghans and the Taliban. The general university 
curricula, however, has been neglected and continues to be outdated, despite 
promises made by the MoHE and U.S. aid agencies to revise them.  The current 
situation at the universities appears to contradict the claim that university 
curricula had been updated in twelve partner universities, including Kabul 
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University. In May and June 2013, Kabul University students protested and went 
on a hunger strike on the university campus for more than three weeks. Their 
demands were for a  revised curriculum, increase in benefits for lecturers, and 
improvements in facilities and dorms.217 
Tahmina Amanzai, a former medical student at Kabul University, laments 
that much of the curriculum does not meet international standards. In her 
experience, the medical curriculum at Kabul University is extremely outdated and 
does not provide up-to-date information as far as maternal health is 
concerned.218 According to Amanzai:  
Pregnant women are dying preventable deaths during labor 
because students are not equipped at school with the latest 
information to perform a C-section for instance. If a woman’s cervix 
is too small, the baby will most likely end up dying because the 
doctors will try to push the baby out, not knowing that that is not the 
best course of action.219  
Disillusioned with the outdated teaching methods and curriculum, Amanzai 
dropped out of Kabul University and was granted admission to AUAf, where she 
says she is receiving current information about medicine.220   
Another problem with the university curricula is the lack of textbooks in the 
native languages of Afghanistan “for the students and teachers who do not have 
the ability to consult the books published in other languages.”221 Reading the 
textbooks requires a mastery of English, which most Afghan Professors and 
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university students do not speak. Compounding the problem is that university 
libraries do not provide a stream of new textbooks for students to access.222 
D. UNQUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS  
Another issue is the dearth of qualified teachers to meet the staggering 
number of students. According to the MoE, in 2012, more than “80 per cent of the 
country’s 165,000 teachers have not achieved the equivalent of a high-school 
education or did not complete their post-secondary school studies.”223 Currently 
in Afghanistan, only about five percent of university staff has Ph.D-level training, 
and they are found mainly in just three universities: Kabul, Kabul Polytechnic, 
and Nangarhar.224 Most universities have either no doctoral staff or just one or 
two. Another approximately 38 percent of staff have master’s-level training. While 
this is a better picture than at the Ph.D level, it is still inadequate. About 57 
percent of university staff members have only bachelor’s degrees.  
In Kabul, university students, including Hamid Aman, complain of poor 
teaching: “In schools these days, you will see 70 to 80 students in a class, and 
the teacher can’t teach that many students well,” he said.  
So, first you need to change the class size, then the teachers. In 
rural areas there are students graduating from high school who 
can’t even read or write properly. Then those graduates are 
teaching the middle school children, so the students aren’t learning 
anything.225  
Also, instructors lack incentive to improve their teaching skills or acquire 
more knowledge because they are often working other jobs to compensate for 
their low salaries at the university. Professors and associate professors make 
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monthly salaries of 15,000 Afghani ($315) and 13,500 Afghani ($280), 
respectively. Lecturers usually make 10,500 Afghani ($220).226  
Journalist-turned-humanitarians Ann Jones and Sarah Chayes, who spent 
extended periods in Afghanistan assisting reconstruction efforts, complained that 
English teachers in Afghanistan were also not properly trained and their teaching 
methods were out of date.227 Their primary concern, however, was that “larger 
programs were ignoring cultural norms; forgetting that top-down change 
strategies have never worked in Afghanistan.”228 Given their history, Afghans 
remain leery about “outsiders” imposing their beliefs and ideology on youth. Any 
educational program implemented must be sensitive to cultural and religious 
norms. Otherwise, Afghans will resist as they have in the past.   
E. CORRUPTION 
Corruption is another major challenge to higher education in Afghanistan. 
Based on Transparency International’s Corruption-Perceptions Index, 
Afghanistan ranks fifth in corruption. A 2011 national survey on corruption 
perceptions, conducted by a coalition of NGOs, indicated that more than 11 
percent of Afghans firmly believe rampant corruption exists in the educational 
sector.229 Three levels of corruption in Afghanistan, ranging from high-level to the 
petty and local, were found by the UR Anti-Corruption Resource Center, a 
Norwegian institution aiding international development strategists in dealing with 
corruption. Figure 1 describes these levels of corruption. 
 
 
                                            
226 Abdulhaqi, “Higher Education in Afghanistan.”  
227 Baharustani, “Comprehensive Study of Higher Education in Afghanistan,” 14–15. 
228 Ibid., 14–15. 
229  Matthew Hall, “Corruption & Afghanistan’s Education Sector,” Civil-Military Fusion 




Policy Level  
Funds are not properly allocated and induces easily corruptible funds 
 
 
Central Ministry Level 
Money is diverted and siphoned off before reaching schools 
 
 
School and Administrative Level 
Petty Bribery by family members, educators for hiring, promotions, access, 
grades, and graduation 
 
Figure 1.  Types of Corruption by Level230 
There are two main fraudulent practices endemic in the Afghan 
educational sector. First is the phenomenon of “ghost teachers,” where 
instructors are not present, yet draw a salary.231 There are reportedly more than 
16,000 to 20,000 ghost teachers in Afghanistan.232 According to a recent study 
by the Institute for Education and Planning (IIEP), ghost teachers lead to larger 
class sizes, as there are not enough teachers to go around. As a result, classes 
are often cancelled, which exacerbates the general distrust of the government. 
The second problem concerns teacher salaries. IIEP reported that because 
teachers are paid in cash, money is “’siphoned off’ at each step of the distribution 
process between MoE, provincial offices, district offices, and individual 
schools.”233 Worsening the situation is the disorder created by dramatically 
increasing enrollment. 
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F. RELIGIOUS RADICALIZATION AND INSECURITY 
Because Afghanistan is a Muslim-majority country, being a religious 
Muslim is not a controversial issue. But problems arise when a rigid version of 
Islam is practiced that condones intolerance and violence. Of concern, therefore, 
is the growing rate of religious radicalization in Afghan universities. The Soviet 
war, coupled with “the control of the educational system by Islamist or 
fundamentalist groups from 1992–2001[,] left a major cultural imprint on the new 
generation’s thinking, even when the majority of the students had no political 
sympathies for the Islamists or the Taliban.”234 Unlike the 1970s, Islam today 
dominates student-council groups in Afghan universities. The Masjid Shura 
(Mosque Council), an Islamic-based student council found throughout university 
campuses, consists of “a president, two deputies, and a council of 23 members 
elected through a completely Islamic and democratic election.235 It focuses on 
cultural and religious issues and imparts Islamic tenets to students. It has 
enormous political clout and has been known to intervene in political affairs to 
defend students. In one instance, several students from Nangarhar University 
were arrested amid allegations that they were connected to Hezb-e-Islami. The 
Masjid Shura intervened and held a meeting with the governor of Nangarhar 
province, who persuaded President Hamid Karzai to release the students. 236 
Access to a university education is now available to all students, from 
diverse ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. Tuition is free at public 
universities, so lower- and middle-class families often enroll. Thus, universities 
reflect a melting pot of students from various social and ethnic backgrounds. 
While the majority of Afghan students are not Muslim extremists, decades of rigid 
Islamic inculcation certainly have had an impact. Unlike the 1970s, when rural 
parts of Afghanistan were considered culturally conservative and religious and 
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urban cities such as Kabul and Herat more liberal and secular, the influx of 
migration into cities has changed that dynamic. Now, there are a mix of religious 
and liberal-minded students at the universities, with the ultra-religious sometimes 
overshadowing the moderates. 
The mullahs at the university who have interpreted such reforms to be 
illegal have been heavily influenced by a more rigid version of Islam stemming 
from the Middle East, Pakistan, and Iran. These mullahs are often not fluent in 
the Arabic language and interpret the Quran and Hadith according to their own 
local, and often patriarchal, traditions. Many of these mullahs dwell at the 
mosque within the university campuses, where students have direct access to 
them.237 Again, mullahs teaching Islam are not problematic so long as they are 
not condoning violence and propagating intolerance. In many instances, 
however, it is evident that mullahs are propagating a rigid interpretation of Islam 
that is comingled with conservative cultural edicts. Often it is Afghan women who 
bear the brunt.  
During Taliban rule, women were barred from receiving an education. 
Since then, Afghanistan has made significant strides in women’s education. 
However, there still remain tremendous obstacles to female access. Currently, 
only 19 percent of the students enrolled in higher education institutions are 
women.238 Cultural norms, in conjunction with factors such as distance and lack 
of security, have been key factors in low female enrollment.239 This paucity of 
female students means that mullahs are able to declare all sorts of decrees 
against women, without women present to defend themselves.  
Religious students often adhere to the rules postulated by Islamic clerics. 
President Karzai passed the Shia Family Law in February 2009. The law 
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essentially formalized discrimination against Shia women by granting “a husband 
the right to withdraw basic maintenance from his wife, including food, if she 
refuses to obey his sexual demands.”240 The law was secretly designed by a 
prominent, hardline Shia leader, Ayatollah Asif Mohseni. Hundreds of students 
from various Afghan universities publicly displayed their support for the law. 
While Afghan women protested in Kabul, Afghan men and women on university 
campuses did not protest the law.241 Afghan women who did attend the protests 
“had to be rescued by police from a hail of stones and abuse.”242 
1. The Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami (HI) and Hezb Ul Tahrir (HuT) 
While the Taliban’s main recruits have been uneducated, rural Pashtun, 
since 2006, the Taliban have begun infiltrating the universities. Students coming 
from Pashtun-dominated regions to study at urban universities are especially 
vulnerable to Taliban recruitment, because the majority of Taliban fighters are 
Pashtun. Taliban propaganda has attempted to manipulate student grievances 
(unemployment and ethnic marginalization) and religious beliefs to gain support 
for the insurgency.243 Currently, vocal support for the Taliban stems primarily 
from Pashtun-dominated universities, including Nangarhar and Jalalabad. 
Nangarhar University, one of the largest in Afghanistan (3,500 students and 250 
faculty), has earned a reputation for active Taliban members. Taliban activists 
and sympathizers at Nangarhar University are predominantly Pashtun, from 
provinces including Wardak, Logar, and the southern regions. While the Taliban 
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presence at Kabul University is suspected to be widespread, its secretive nature 
makes it difficult to pinpoint just how many members are on campus.244 
Hizb-e-Islami (HI) is also very influential on university campuses, including 
Nangarhar and Jalalabad. Many of the members have participated in public 
demonstrations against Americans. Hostels have become the central place for 
nighttime political gatherings by anti and pro-government student unions. Hostel 
walls are littered with such slogans as “long live the Taliban,” and “long live 
Hekmatyar.”245  
Hezb Ul Tahrir (HuT) is a neo-Salafist, pan-Islamist, and transnational 
political organization heavily active in Pashtun-dominated Afghan universities. 
HuT seeks to reestablish the caliphate and bring all Muslim countries under one 
state. More importantly, “HuT’s ideology is different and more radical than that of 
Hezb-e Islami, Ustad Sayyaf’s Dawat-e Islami (which became Afghanistan’s first 
Salafi mujahedin group in the 1980s) and, even that of the Taliban’s insurgent 
Salafism.”246 HuT could potentially recruit Afghan university students who have 
experienced decades of Islamist influence and who are disillusioned by 
ubiquitous corruption, skyrocketing unemployment, and ethnic divisions. 
Although HuT claims to be all-inclusive, it has openly opposed many Shia 
rituals.247  
Herat University has seen little religious activism, but pockets of activity 
surface nonetheless. The Islamic-law faculty in particular has been associated 
with relatively high levels of militancy. Also, many HI members attend the 
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campus. According to some reports, “the legitimacy of suicide bombings is 
openly discussed in the classrooms.”248 More importantly, secular students have 
repeatedly voiced feelings of intimidation by the increasingly religious climate at 
the university.249 
Considering the enormous rates of university enrollment, the number of 
students actively involved in “rebellious” activities is relatively low in the post-
2001 environment, although some fear its gradual increase.250 Sympathy for the 
armed opposition is widespread among Pashtun students and in Pashtun-
majority universities. Nangarhar, the only predominantly Pashtun university, is a 
case in point, but the same processes can be observed to some degree among 
Pashtun students attending Kabul and Herat universities, which exhibit 
something of the same pattern.  
The majority of Afghan youth are Muslim, but even if they are not religious 
extremists, they remain loyal to their religion and culture. The government and 
U.S. aid agencies should therefore attend to cultural and religious norms in the 
educational system because neglect will lead to a backlash, especially in 
religiously conservative universities. Implementing a “one-size-fits-all model” has 
led to occasions in the past where students in various conservative universities, 
including Takhar and Khost, refused to “use textbooks displaying ‘un-Islamic’ 
images such as people drinking alcohol or women in strapless dresses and 
awkward moments relating to appropriate behavior in mixed-gender setting.”251 
Kabul University students, including Abdul Mateen Aziz Yar, a student of 
engineering, have expressed discontent with the “moral clash” taking place in the 
university. He conveyed his frustration in the Weekly Bahar:  
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We can see that rather than emphasizing on teaching, the Kabul 
University is laying greater stress on promoting moral clash and it is 
clearly visible that moral clash is increasing day by day in the 
university. I request the Minister of Higher Education to take such 
steps as would put a stop to this moral crisis.252  
Disregarding Afghan mores can backfire as youth—regardless of their 
religiosity—have historically resisted outside influence they perceive as morally 
decadent or against their beliefs. Similar to Southeast Asian countries, 
Afghanistan might embrace capitalism, but not necessarily Western liberal ideals.  
2. Insecurity 
The Taliban have been targeting universities and schools they accuse of 
propagating Western culture and anti-Islamic teachings. Amnesty International 
interviewed a Taliban spokesman who claimed they were closing schools whose 
“books have been printed in the USA” with the “curriculum…developed by 
foreigners.”253 The Taliban do not offer a competing curriculum. Instead, they tell 
parents to send their sons to madrassas in neighboring Pakistan for Islamic 
studies.254 Some factions within the Taliban have called for education to be 
limited to conservative Deobandi or Salafi Islamic education in the madrassas 
they control.255 Their primary objective is to close down the schools they 
consider anti-Islamic or funded by the West. On numerous occasions, the 
Taliban Leadership Council has issued statements condemning the government-
backed schools: 
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Present academic curriculum is influenced by the puppet 
administration and foreign invaders…Use of the curriculum as a 
mouthpiece of the state will provoke the people against it.256 
The Taliban have continuously been sending shabnameh, “night letters,” 
to school officials in Kandahar, Wardark, Kapisa, and Zabul provinces, 
threatening reprisals if they did not shut down the schools.257 The night letters 
also demanded that Afghans join the jihad refrain from working with foreign 
organizations and the Afghan government.258 Between 2004 and 2008, there 
were 722 attacks against schools educational facilities, staff, and students.259 
Also, between 2006 and 2009, more than 439 instructors and staff were killed.260  
In 2010, violence targeted against students prevented more than five million 
children and youth from going to school. According to Deputy Minister Siddiq 
Patman, “there is no day that goes by when a school-related security incident is 
not reported to the Ministry of Education.” As of March 2009, more than 650 
schools have been closed down by insurgent attacks or threats, taking the right 
to education away from around 500,000 children in four southern provinces of 
Afghanistan.261  
3. Last Resort: Joining the Insurgency  
Youth in rural parts of Afghanistan who cannot gain admittance to a university, 
find employment, or leave the country, may end up joining the insurgency. 
Although some join the Taliban out of religious convictions, the majority join 
because they have no alternative means of providing for their family. While 
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joining the Afghan security forces is possible, many rural youth reject the choice 
out of fear of retaliation by the Taliban and the dangers involved with the job.262 
Afghan youth are vital to Taliban military operations because they notify 
insurgent members of the movements and locations of ISAF soldiers and 
increase the Taliban’s combat capabilities. Afghan youth in rural areas are 
especially prone to joining the Taliban because they are often the breadwinners 
of the household. According to a recent survey conducted by the Asia 
Foundation, most Afghan youth, particularly in rural provinces, are pessimistic 
about their futures and believe that that government has neglected to address 
their grievances.263 Currently, more than 70 percent of Afghan youth living in the 
country provinces are unemployed.264 While many have moved to the city for 
better opportunities, those who remain are forced to assess their options. The 
temptation to join the Taliban is certainly there considering the Taliban reportedly 
pay their foot soldiers $300 per month, whereas an Afghan policeman earns 
$165 per month.265   
G. YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT  
Presently, the estimated graduate unemployment rate in Afghanistan is 65 
percent.266 According to the government, more than 500,000 jobs must be 
created annually to “stave off increasing unemployment.”267 The problem is that 
most university graduates have not acquired the skills necessary to be 
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competitive in the job market. As articulated by Alastair McKechnie, the former 
World Bank director for Afghanistan:  
Part of the problem is that for many people, they don’t have the 
security of a regular job. I think there is part-time work around. But 
it’s essentially daily work, which is inherently insecure, particularly if 
people have families to support and other commitments…People 
simply cannot afford to be unemployed.268  
Today, more than 63 percent of young employees occupy temporary and 
uncertain positions of “apprentices” or “trainees” that require little or no legal 
obligation from their employers.269 
H. BRAIN DRAIN 
The limited access to higher education and employment opportunities, as 
well as growing insecurity in the country, has resulted in many students pursuing 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees abroad. More than 5,000 Afghan 
students study in a diverse range of countries, including Germany, Iran, Pakistan, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.270 
Overseas education is an extremely expensive option, particularly if students 
enroll in higher education in developed countries. It also contributes to the brain 
drain, as many Afghan students who travel overseas or are granted scholarships 
abroad fail to return, and take up jobs in foreign countries. Although the United 
States has provided scholarships, including the Fulbright, the reality is that 
“becoming a scholarship guarantee [for Afghan youth] has been like getting a 
free ticket to jump from the United States to seek asylum in Canada.”271 Afghan 
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students are often offered scholarships and fellowships to study abroad, with the 
expectation that they will return to Afghanistan after their study programs are 
over. The reality, however, is that the majority of these youth never return or 
simply disappear before the program ends. A grim future for Afghanistan has 
prompted students to leave the program and apply for asylum in other countries. 
Harris Najib, a former Fulbright scholar working as a case manager with a 
nonprofit in Calgary, Canada, is one of the students who opted out of returning to 
Afghanistan. His reason was the political turmoil embroiling the country and a 
lack of job prospects.272 In response to the staggering dropout rates among 
Afghan youth, the State Department suspended the Youth Exchange and Study 
Program (also known as the YES Program) in 2011. More than half the students 
reportedly applied for asylum to Canada.273 Meetra Alakozy, a former alumnus of 
the YES program who returned to Afghanistan, expresses consternation about 
the future in her country:  
I am worried about NATO forces leaving, because I know that if 
they leave, [the] Afghan army is not that powerful to maintain the 
security in Afghanistan. As an Afghan girl, there will be challenges 
for me. Maybe I cannot go out again, maybe I cannot go study, if 
they leave and if Taliban come because ... then I cannot go to 
school anymore, I have to stay home, I cannot work and I cannot 
do anything, so I am worried about it.274 
 Ethnic Hazaras, who have experienced decades of discrimination and 
violence, have also been migrating—both legally and illegally—at staggering 
numbers to European countries.275 In a recent interview with Al Jazeera, one 
young man lamented, “The situation is so bad that we can’t even bring back the 
skills we will gain [in training] to our own country.” 276 Psychologically, Afghan 
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youth are placed in a Catch-22: Why would they risk returning to Afghanistan, 
given the current and future uncertainties? 
As youth continue exiting the country in large numbers, the brain drain 
depletes the stock of well-educated Afghans available as academics for the 
universities. Many young professors who have studied in the West and are 
updated on the educational curriculum have either left the country or are working 
for international NGOs for huge sums of money.277 The struggle has therefore 
been how to retain graduates whose earning potential and standard of living are 
considerably higher overseas.  
I. CONCLUSION 
There are significant challenges in higher education that the government 
and U.S. aid agencies have not addressed. Afghan youth constitute the majority 
demographic in Afghanistan, and neglecting their needs and concerns spells a 
recipe for disaster. Failing to address educational problems, including an inability 
to absorb student enrollment, poor infrastructure, outdated curricula, unqualified 
instructors, unemployment, religious radicalization, and insecurity, encourages 
many Afghan youth to flee the country or join the insurgency.  
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V. SUMMARY RESULTS, RECOMMENDATIONS,  
AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY RESULTS 
Modernization theory asserts that when people in a traditional society 
become educated, the society grows more stabilized and the chances of 
democratization increase. The Afghan constitution states that education is a 
universal right for all citizens, and therefore tuition is free, from the primary to 
tertiary levels. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the number of universities, 
teachers, and students ballooned. Nevertheless, the educational system faces 
many problems that, combined with the youth bulge, present a host of concerns 
for the country. Despite attempts to improve higher education in Afghanistan, 
challenges remain, including an inability to absorb student enrollment, poor 
infrastructure, outdated curricula, unqualified instructors, religious radicalization, 
insecurity, and high youth unemployment. Mass protests in universities, the brain 
drain, and increasing numbers of youth joining the insurgency all point to the 
failure of both the Afghan government and U.S. aid agencies.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although higher education has progressed since the fall of the Taliban, the 
Afghan government and U.S. aid agencies can do much more to address the 
concerns and interests of Afghan youth. It is understandable that not all students 
will receive an education or have a job after graduation, so it is important to set 
realistic aims in dealing with the following problems. 
1. Inability to Absorb Student Enrollment and Public Universities 
The public university cannot realistically absorb all high-school graduates, 
so students who are not admitted need viable options. Although private 
universities are a good alternative, there must be strong regulation and oversight 
to ensure that these universities are providing quality education with good job 
prospects for university graduates, and not merely seeking to maximize profits. 
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Private universities can use their resources to set high benchmarks that meet the 
standards of prestigious international institutions.  
A promising approach for Afghanistan may come from nearby Pakistan, 
where the government has successfully partnered with many private universities 
to address growing student demand without overloading the public budget. The 
Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC) provided funding for private 
universities to improve the quality of the curricula.278 Strengthening relations with 
the private sector is the best bet for the Afghan government as well, because it 
will enable the government to monitor and hold private universities accountable. 
These schools should be collaborating, not competing. 
2. Poor Infrastructure  
Bangladesh provides a model of how Afghanistan might skip development 
steps by facilitating Internet connectivity. In the past three decades, much of the 
infrastructure in public universities was damaged, looted, or destroyed. Although 
rebuilding will require considerable time, the Afghan government can meanwhile 
incorporate the Bangladeshi model. The Bangladeshi government established 
the Bangladesh Higher Education Quality Enhancement Project to provide high-
speed Internet connectivity within the country and create a digital library 
subscribing to international electronic resources such JSTOR, World Cat, and 
Emerald. Internet access compensates for the lack of physical books and allows 
universities the means to catch up with knowledge in other countries. 
An aspect of the SHEP program mentioned in Chapter IV was to improve 
facilities and laboratories in twelve partner universities. Although some of these 
universities progressed, the government and aid agencies must monitor the 
program’s progress toward its objectives and follow up to see whether students 
and faculty are satisfied. If so, funding should be increased for the program so 
remaining universities can have their facilities fixed as well. 
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3. Outdated Curricula  
The Afghan government and the SHEP program have taken proactive 
steps to update curricula in the majority of public universities, but more needs to 
be done to make curricula relevant. One possible solution is implementing what 
Suranaree University of Technology in Thailand has done as a form of 
cooperative education. As part of the program, students enrolled in a particular 
degree program also work full-time as employees at a worksite. Students are 
also expected to take a minimum of two trimesters of cooperative study. The 
program produces students who are more job-ready and curricula that adapt 
quickly to market changes.  
Building partnerships with other international higher institutions is another 
way to improve curricula in universities. In 2005, the University of Nebraska 
Medical Center (UNMC) met with Kabul Medical University (KMU) administrators 
to revamp dated curricula. Six health professionals from Afghanistan went to 
UNMC to learn about best new practices in medical care and student education. 
UNMC also sent medical-school textbooks to replace obsolete materials.279 The 
only problem with sending medical textbooks in English is the question of 
translation to Dari and Pashto for student use. The point, however, is that an 
Afghan university with international relationships can pilot a new curriculum, 
consolidate what they learned, and submit it for approval by the MoHE, which will 
distribute it to universities throughout the country.  
4. Unqualified Instructors 
Most of the talented instructors have fled Afghanistan—first during the 
Soviet occupation, then during the civil war between mujahedeen factions, and 
most recently in the Taliban era. Instructors who are not qualified or trained in the 
latest information related to their subject prevent students from acquiring the best 
education. Workshops should be available to help teachers improve their 
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pedagogical skills. The MOHE and U.S. aid agencies should allocate more funds 
to skills development for professors, so that teachers are current in their subject.  
Teachers must often work multiple jobs, because salaries at a public 
university are not enough to maintain a decent standard of living. Not only should 
instructor salaries be increased, but incentives for doing a good job also need to 
be created. One possible suggestion is competitive, conditional, and 
performance-based funding for instructors. In 2013, the U.S. spent $23 million in 
Afghan teacher-training colleges; this has been a step in the right direction.280 
Public universities need to build relationships with international universities 
and have exchange programs in which instructors can learn new teaching 
methods. The SHEP program has proven highly effective in sending instructors 
abroad and imparting new insights. With SHEP funding at Balkh University, 
Professor Farida Ansari was one of about 20 professors who went abroad to 
complete her master’s degree and Ph.D at a Turkish university. She stated that 
her experience enabled her discover innovative ways of teaching her students.281 
Another professor from Balkh University, Mohammad Shah, shared similar 
feelings about teaching abroad through the SHEP program: 
It was the first time that I went outside Afghanistan to study, and I 
realized how we could do so many things better,” he says. “Not only 
were foreign teaching methods different and the facilities so good, 
but we also learned about other cultures. Without this contact with 
the outside world, we cannot reach higher peaks of knowledge.282 
As of 2013, more than 345 faculty members have received their master’s 
degrees. Of that figure, 134 completed their degree in country, while the 
remaining 211 finished abroad.283  The SHEP program should be expanded to 
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more universities, because of its relative success rate with the twelve partner 
universities.  
The United States should also encourage partnerships with Western 
universities so that instructors can acquire greater teaching skills and be updated 
with the latest knowledge. One successful partnership was between San Diego 
State University (SDSU) and Nangarhar University (NU). The World Bank 
provided SDSU more than $4 million to aid NU, including funding of an English-
language program and a redesign of the outdated engineering program to 
accelerate rebuilding efforts and create a better-educated work force. What made 
the partnership successful was that SDSU gave NU full ownership of the 
program. 284 
SDSU listened to what the needs of NU faculty, students, and 
administrators and shaped its strategy accordingly—not the other way around. 
The partnership was centered on the local needs of NU and not some universal 
blueprint.  
Another possible course of action for the Afghan government is to emulate 
Pakistan by offering instructors a performance-based, tenure-track system.  
Tenure Track provides an opportunity for life-time employment 
following a certain number of years of teaching, which may be 
viewed as a trial period. The Tenure Track System has been 
institutionalized in almost 90 percent of all public universities 
and higher education institutes in the country. The system is 
applied to all new faculty appointments, while existing faculty have 
the opportunity to apply for it.285 
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5. Corruption 
Corruption in higher education must be addressed. Based on the Afghan 
National Development Strategy (ANDS), which serves as the country’s principal 
document for development efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals 
set by the United Nations, the Afghan government and U.S. aid agencies 
recognize that “corruption undermin[es] the accountability of government, 
erod[es] public trust and reduc[es] the legitimacy of state institutions.”286 The 
ANDS report also acknowledges that corruption is a crosscutting issue, and so 
the ministries of education, higher education, and finance need to implement 
institutional reforms to minimize, if not entirely prevent, its occurrence. The Basic 
Education Support Systems for Teachers (BESST) is a USAID-funded program 
that was initiated and was specifically designed to “modernize the university 
entrance exam system, develop an electronic bank transfer system for teacher 
salaries and create forgery-proof university diplomas.”287 Other aspects of the 
BESST program include addressing low teacher pay and non-merit-based hiring, 
initiating management-training courses for faculty members, and formulating 
competency tests for principals and teachers. The program ended in August 
2011, but the momentum continues with follow-up projects and activities. 
To better monitor the educational system and expose ghost teachers, the 
MoE developed an Education Management Information System (EMIS) that 
registers employees properly by profession, position, and work location. Both the 
MoE and MoHE have begun to expand EMIS capabilities to monitor student 
enrollment, exam attendance, and teacher attendance. The MoF has also 
initiated a program called the Afghanistan Financial Management Information 
System (AFMIS) to monitor funds allocated to education, both at the central and 
regional levels.288  
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The Accountability and Transparency program (ACT), established by the 
Afghan government and U.S. aid agencies, also focuses on increasing 
transparency in education. The MoE created the Office for Anti-Corruption 
Implementation Plan, in which six complaint offices were opened in Kabul, 
including ministries and directorates for city education, technical and vocational 
education, Kabul Province education, Islamic education, and literacy and teacher 
training. As a result of their collaboration, in 2011 more than 168 out of 216 
complaints received were resolved. The majority of the complaints dealt with 
bribery, abuse of power, and delays in services and resources.289 
The Afghan government and U.S. agencies have taken needed steps to 
address corruption in education. If these programs are successful in increasing 
transparency in funds allocation, eliminating ghost teachers, and stopping 
bribery, then they need to be continued, especially if they have expired or are on 
the brink. 
6. Religious Radicalization  
The United States presently emphasizes education reform in Afghanistan 
as a means of countering radical Islam and promulgating democratization. 
Combatting radicalization requires providing alternate curricula. The United 
States has achieved this at the primary and secondary level, but has neglected 
curriculum reform at the university level. The Afghan government and U.S. aid 
agencies need to be extremely careful about endorsing Western liberal practices, 
especially in conservative universities such as Jalalabad, Khost, and Takhar. 
Some Western policymakers assume that Afghan society can be morphed “into a 
Westernized one by implementing co-education, organizing concerts and 
unnecessary intermingling of boys and girls, and changing dress codes.”290 
Promoting such practices is highly counterproductive and can lead to a backlash 
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among conservative segments of the population. Afghan history demonstrates 
how resistant Afghans are to liberal, Western ideas. Instead, the focus should be 
to respect the cultural and religious norms that are paramount to Afghans.  
One approach that Afghanistan can take to mitigate religious extremism 
has been demonstrated by East Africa. Similar to Afghanistan, East Africa is 
experiencing a burgeoning youth population and dealing with violent extremist 
organizations that have extended their influence throughout the country. East 
Africa initiated several high-level workshops to “foster a deeper understanding of 
the drivers of youth radicalization in the region and to generate policy 
recommendations aimed at decreasing the appeal of violent extremist groups.”291 
Many key stakeholders participated, including East African government officials, 
civil-society groups, and other attendees who offered various perspectives from 
“military, intelligence, law enforcement, development, culture, communications, 
and civil society backgrounds.”292 One takeaway from the Preventing Youth 
Radicalization workshop was that technology can be leveraged to resist extremist 
propaganda and endorse alternative options to religious extremism. Another 
lesson learned was that religion is not inherently a source of violence and that 
the goal should therefore be to use the religion itself to promote a positive 
message. Applying such an idea could work well for Afghanistan. There are a 
plethora of verses in the Quran that condemn the killing of innocent civilians, and 
that message is what the Afghan government should try to disseminate through 
social media and online forums. For instance, chapter five, verse 32 of the Holy 
Quran states:  
We ordained for the Children of Israel that if any one slew a 
person—unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the 
land—it would be as if he slew the whole people: and if any one 
saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole 
people.293 
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This verse provides irrefutable proof that not only does Islam condemn the 
killing of the innocent, but it makes a clear statement that killing one innocent 
person is as though you killed all of humanity. While the Taliban might use other 
verses from the Quran to justify their actions, the Afghan government should 
consistently spread Quranic verses that refute the Taliban’s claims.  
The Taliban continue to resist government-backed schools, amid claims 
that they endorse anti-Islamic teachings and subjects.294 Physical attacks or 
threats against universities and their staff hinder learning directly and indirectly. 
Since the Taliban will reject any compromise with the Afghan government and 
U.S. aid agencies, security needs to be provided to youth who are attending 
university, in the form of increased security personnel at the schools and bus 
transportation to and from. 
A 2013 report by Human Rights Watch offers valuable recommendations 
that the Afghan government can implement to mitigate security risks. The report 
recommended that the Afghan government collaborate with other agencies, 
including the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, UNICEF, UNDP, 
and UNIFEM, to implement a strategy to monitor, deter, and respond to attacks 
on education. The report also suggested that the ministry of education and 
international agencies establish a national database with current information 
gathered from provincial educational offices. Using the data gained from 
monitoring, the government and international agencies should focus on schools 
that are most at risk of attack and ensure they are provided with resources and 
security. Other suggestions include getting the local community involved by 
setting up rotating shifts of volunteer night watchmen and installing monitors 
along the roads at the times students go to and from school. The final 
recommendation is to respond quickly and forcefully to attacks, by conducting 
investigations and prosecuting the perpetrators. To restore confidence among 
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students and faculty, the government should also immediately rebuild damaged 
schools that were attacked.  
Although security is an integral prerequisite to education, it cannot be 
achieved solely through force. The Taliban are neither a monolithic group nor 
adherents to a central command. As a result of factionalism within the Taliban, 
authorities have been able to negotiate to keep some of the schools open. 
According to a report by IRIN: 
Asif Nang, a spokesman for the Ministry of Education, told IRIN the 
government was ready to negotiate with the opposition over 
schools and would be willing to accommodate their religious 
reservations. “If they want schools called “madrasa” we will accept 
that, if they want to say Mullah to a teacher we no problem with 
that. Whatever objections they [the Taliban] may have we are ready 
to talk to them,” Nang said. The Ministry of Education also 
emphasized that its curriculum was entirely in accordance with 
Islamic values and girls were required to comply with Islamic 
dressing codes (including wearing the hijab) to school. Owing to 
this appeasing approach, the government has reopened 24 schools 
in Helmand, Ghazni and Kandahar provinces previously shut by 
insurgents.295 
In certain instances, it might be possible to enter negotiate with the local Taliban 
to allow students to go to school. The military route should not be the only option, 
especially if some Taliban factions are amenable to allowing school attendance 
so long as the schools meet their Islamic standards. The Afghan government 
should therefore capitalize on this tendency and attempt to engage in dialogue 
with those Taliban who are willing.  
7.  Youth Unemployment  
Youth unemployment is a major issue in Afghanistan, especially for 
university graduates. The Afghan government and U.S. aid agencies must 
establish proper mechanisms that will provide Afghan youth access to jobs after 
graduation. Otherwise, an unemployed but educated youth population becomes 
just as potentially destabilizing as masses of uneducated, unemployed youth. 
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Oftentimes, students are not aware of open jobs, particularly government jobs. A 
recent survey by Samuel Hall, a research and consulting company in 
Afghanistan, revealed that the young often hear about employment vacancies 
through family members or friends.296 Suggestions include publicly announcing 
job vacancies and using the media to disperse information regarding vacant 
positions. Universities should be encouraged to offer workshops on resumes and 
networking techniques. Weak resumes often stop Afghan youth from landing 
good jobs, because applicants are not aware of what should appear in a resume 
or how to make themselves attractive to companies.   
Building more vocational schools, in which students are taught the skills 
needed to perform a particular job, is another option. In 2008–2009, there were 
33 vocational schools, 6,606 students and 497 teachers, which increased to 97 
vocational schools 14,056 students and 732 teachers by 2011.297 
C. CONCLUDING POINTS 
Improving Afghanistan’s higher-education system requires strategic 
planning by the Afghan and U.S. governments, but it can be done. SHEP has 
been a step in the right direction, but needs better funding to accommodate 
public universities that are struggling with poor infrastructure, outdated curricula, 
unqualified instructors and lax security. The Afghan government and U.S. aid 
agencies must attack all of the root causes of "youth bulge" and formulate a 
higher education plan in a coordinated, systematic way with indicators and 
metrics for improvement. Certain aspects should be handled by NGOs on a 
competitive bid basis and overseen by the Afghan government and the 
communities/universities being affected. 
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Although tremendous progress has been made since 2001, youth in 
Afghanistan remain skeptical of their future, due to lack of high quality education 
and jobs. While some have engaged in protests, many others have fled the 
country or joined the insurgency. In light of the impending U.S. troop withdrawal, 
Afghan youth must not be neglected. This large segment of the population will 
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